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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State, Department of Fish & Game
In Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State, Department of Fish & Game,1 the
supreme court (1) upheld a regulation setting out criteria for classifying fisheries, and (2)
found that per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users
was permissible data for the Board of Fisheries (“Board”) to use in making their
determination.2 At different points in the last several decades, the Chitina subdistrict of
the Copper River Basin has been classified as either a “personal use” fishery or a
subsistence fishery.3 Most recently, the Board labeled Chitina as “personal use,” and
citizen groups challenged this finding by claiming the regulation used to make it was
facially unconstitutional, in large part because it favored rural communities.4 The
superior court held that the regulation was constitutional, but remanded to the Board to
better articulate its standard in applying the regulation, with instructions not to consider
the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users. 5 On
appeal, the supreme court agreed with the superior court’s finding that the regulation was
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constitutional, but found that information regarding per capita consumption may be
relevant in making a subsistence or “personal use” designation, and therefore should not
be categorically excluded.6 Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court (1)
upheld a regulation setting out criteria for classifying fisheries, and (2) found that per
capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users was
permissible data for the Board of Fisheries to use in making their determination.7
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State,8 the supreme court held that the Alaska
Department of Natural Resources’ (“Department”) calculation of the fair market value of
land covered by right-of-way leases for the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (“TAPS”) may
properly (1) exclude reductions for reserved rights, and (2) include uncontested
submerged lands.9 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (“Alyeska”) appealed the terms of
its TAPS lease renewal imposed by the Department.10 Alyeska claimed that the renewal
was improper under the Alaska statute that governs the calculation of the lease price.11
The supreme court determined that the lease price was properly calculated based on the
fair market value of the state land and did not require consideration of the rights granted
or retained in the lease.12 The supreme court also held that the TAPS lease may properly
include submerged lands because the state holds presumptive title to all submerged lands
within its original 1959 borders unless the federal government has contested or claimed
an interest in those lands.13 Affirming, the supreme court held that the Department
calculation of the fair market value of land covered by right-of-way leases for TAPS may
properly (1) exclude reductions for reserved rights, and (2) include uncontested
submerged lands.14
Caywood v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In Caywood v. State, Department of Natural Resources,15 the supreme court held that (1)
restrictions on the use of the Rex Trail imposed by the Department of Natural Resources
(“Department”) are authorized by law,16 and (2) restrictions imposed by the Department
limiting the weight of vehicles that may travel on the Rex Trail during certain times of
year met the reasonable basis standard for decision-making by a state agency.17 In 2008,
the Department’s northern region manager issued a decision restricting vehicles weighing
more than 1,500 pounds from using the Rex Trail between April 15 and October 31, due
to potential road damage.18 Caywood appealed the decision, the Department
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Commissioner denied Caywood’s appeal, and the superior court affirmed.19 On appeal to
the supreme court, Caywood argued that the Commissioner did not have authority to
impose the restrictions, or alternatively that the necessity of the restrictions was not
supported by substantial evidence.20 The supreme court first agreed that the
Commissioner did not have authority under the relevant Alaska statute because that
statute was limited to situations in which the land is held by a grantee, but it reasoned that
the Commissioner did have authority under the administrative code, which recognizes the
Commissioner’s authority over certain rights-of-way.21 Next, the supreme court disagreed
that the restrictions must be supported by substantial evidence, instead holding that policy
decisions regarding restrictions on the use of state land are reviewed under the reasonable
basis standard, and that the Commissioner had ample evidence to make his decision.22
Affirming, the supreme court held that (1) restrictions on the use of the Rex Trail
imposed by the Department are authorized by law,23 and (2) restrictions imposed by the
Department limiting the weight of vehicles that may travel on the Rex Trail during
certain times of year met the reasonable basis standard for decision-making by a state
agency.24
Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough
In Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough,25 the supreme court held that the Kodiak Island
Borough (“Borough”) does not have authority to record liens for non-payment of garbage
services.26 The Sabados hired David to tear down a structure on their property in
Kodiak.27 Unbeknownst to the Sabados, David set up a commercial garbage account with
the Borough, and accrued a $5000 balance on that account. 28 David failed to pay, and the
account became delinquent.29 In 2009 the Borough recorded a lien against the property,
and in 2010 petitioned for foreclosure.30 Upon learning of the lien and foreclosure action,
Cutler, the new owner of the property, filed an answer and counterclaim arguing that the
lien had been wrongfully recorded.31 The superior court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Borough and entered default judgment on the garbage-service liens.32
Relying on other instances where the legislature specifically granted boroughs the
authority to record property liens, the supreme court reasoned that boroughs do not
possess this authority where the legislature has not made such a grant. 33 Reversing, the
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supreme court held that the Borough does not have the authority to record liens for nonpayment of garbage services.34
In re Joan K.
In In re Joan K.,35 the supreme court held that a thirty day involuntary commitment to a
psychiatric institute was justified where clear and convincing evidence supported the
finding that the individual suffered from a mental illness and posed a substantial risk of
bodily harm to herself.36 Joan disappeared for three weeks, and her mother later found her
and brought her to a hospital.37 Emergency room staff examined Joan and found her
confused, and she also tested positive for amphetamines and cocaine.38 A physician
sought Joan’s involuntary commitment for mental health treatment.39 The lower court
ordered a thirty day commitment, which Joan appealed.40 The supreme court affirmed,
reasoning that Joan’s continued illegal drug use would exacerbate her mental illness and
cause a self-destructive downward spiral of her mental and physical health.41 The court
noted that, although Joan never articulated a desire to harm herself, she showed
symptoms of lethargy and opioid withdrawal that follow stimulant abuse.42 The court
further noted that the plain text of the relevant Alaska statute directs courts to consider
recent behavior and does not require affirmative statements regarding future drug use.43
Affirming, the supreme court held that Joan’s thirty day involuntary commitment was
justified where clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that she suffered
from a mental illness and posed a substantial risk of bodily harm to herself.44
McCleod v. Parnell
In McCleod v. Parnell,45 the supreme court held that (1) state records which are preserved
or are appropriate for preservation under the Records Management Act are subject to
review under the Public Records Act, and (2) the use of private email accounts to conduct
state business, alone, is not a per se obstruction to “public records.”46McCleod brought an
action in superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that all emails sent between Sarah
Palin and her husband’s private email accounts were “public records” if the subject of the
email in any way related to official business of the state, and also seeking an injunction
compelling the governor’s office to preserve these emails, stop using private email
accounts to conduct government business, and to retrieve deleted emails from those
accounts.47 The superior court ultimately granted the State’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the case, holding that not every email referring to state business
34
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is a “public record,” that there is an element of discretion in deciding which emails to
preserve, and that using private emails to conduct state business is not a per se
obstruction of access to public records.48 However, the court held additionally that state
employees who fail to preserve public records that should be preserved might violate the
law.49 The supreme court agreed in part, reasoning that the legislature intended that both
public records that are preserved and those that are appropriate for preservation are
subject to review under the Public Records Act,50 but that the use of private emails is no
more of a violation of the Act than communicating through paper letters. 51 Affirming in
part, the supreme court held that (1) state records which are preserved or are appropriate
for preservation under the Records Management Act are subject to review under the
Public Records Act, and (2) the use of private email accounts to conduct state business,
alone, is not a per se obstruction to “public records.”.52
Price v. Unisea, Inc.
In Price v. Unisea, Inc.,53 the supreme court held that an international organization is
immune from suit where immunity has not been expressly waived.54 In 2006, Price was
injured while working for the International Pacific Halibut Commission (“IPHC”),an
international organization established by a treaty between the United States and Canada.55
Price filed a negligence action but the superior court dismissed the suit on immunity
grounds.56 Price appealed, arguing that IPHC had waived immunity in their employment
agreement.57 The supreme court rejected Price’s arguments, reasoning that the
International Organizations Immunities Act provides absolute immunity to international
organizations that must be expressly waived.58 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
employee benefits clause in the contract did not transform into a clause waiving
immunity for suits related to those benefits in state court.59 Affirming, the supreme court
held that an international organization is immune from suit where immunity has not been
expressly waived.60
Runstrom v. Alaska Native Med. Ctr.
In Runstrom v. Alaska Native Med. Ctr.,61 the supreme court held that an employer can
rebut an employee’s claim of being temporarily totally disabled by providing substantial
evidence that the employee could actually return to work.62 While working, Runstrom’s
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eyes were sprayed with fluids from an HIV-positive patient.63 Subsequently, she received
temporary total disability (“TTD”) until the Alaska Native Medical Center (“Center”)
later controverted her benefits because the Center determined no further medical care was
needed after her HIV test came back negative.64 The Center also attempted to place
Runstrom back into her previously held position, but she refused. 65 About a month later,
Runstrom was terminated for her failure to return to work.66 On appeal, Runstrom argued
that she was improperly denied TTD benefits from the Alaska Workers’ Compensation
Board because her employer failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the
presumption that she was disabled.67 The supreme court affirmed the Workers’
Compensation Commission, reasoning a doctor and a primary health provider’s opinions
that she could return to work provided substantial evidence supporting the employer’s
and the Board’s determinations.68 Furthermore, the court noted that Runstrom failed to
offer any evidence to the contrary.69 Affirming the Commission, the supreme court held
that an employer can rebut an employee’s claim of being temporarily totally disabled by
providing substantial evidence that the employee could actually return to work.70
Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka
In Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka,71 the supreme court
held that an initiative to make current law applicable to all, instead of just some,
transactions of a certain type cannot be contrary to law and, therefore, unenforceable.72
Sitka law required that the city’s assembly pass an ordinance which must be ratified by
Sitka voters before large land transactions could be completed.73 However, Sawmill Cove
was put under the management of a board of directors who only needed a resolution from
the assembly in order to complete large land transactions.74 After a citizens’ petition to
align large land transactions involving Sawmill Cove with all other land transactions by
the city was denied by the city’s municipal clerk before collection of supporting elector
signatures, a complaint was filed in superior court.75 On appeal, the citizens argued that
the initiative did not violate the Sitka Charter because it would not add any procedures
that were not already in place for similar transactions.76 The supreme court agreed and
reversed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the initiative was only an extension
of current applicable law.77 It further reasoned that even if supporting elector signatures
are necessary before a voter approval is appropriate under the Sitka Charter, such grounds
cannot justify finding an extension of current applicable law contrary to law just because
63
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current applicable law may violate the charter.78 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that a citizens’ initiative that would make current law applicable to
all, instead of just some, transactions of a certain type cannot be contrary to law, and,
therefore, unenforceable.79
State, Department of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council
In State, Department of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council,80 the supreme
court held that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (“BBAP”) – a plan that directs how the
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) will manage state uplands, shorelands,
tidelands, and submerged lands – is not a regulation.81 Tribal councils filed suit against
the DNR alleging that the DNR unlawfully adopted the BBAP, and sought declaratory
judgment that the BBAP no longer had any legal effect. 82 The DNR argued that the
causes of action at issue were barred because they were not brought within the proper
limitations period.83 Tribal councils argued that, since the BBAP was a regulation, it was
subject to judicial review at any time.84 The lower court concluded that the BBAP was a
regulation and therefore was subject to judicial review.85 The supreme court reversed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the BBAP did not affect the public and was not
used by the agency in dealing with the public.86 The court noted that, though the BBAP
certainly affected the public in a broad sense, this nonspecific, downstream effect alone
was insufficient to demonstrate sufficient meaningful impact.87 Reversing the lower
court, the supreme court held that the BBAP is not a regulation.88
State Department of Health & Social Services v. North Star Hospital
In State Department of Health & Social Services v. North Star Hospital,89 the supreme
court held that an agency calculating Medicaid rates may abuse its discretion by relying
on outdated data when current data would produce significantly different results.90 The
Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS) calculated the Medicaid payment rate
for North Star Hospital (NSH) for fiscal years 2008–2011 using a report from 2005 even
though NSH’s home-office costs nearly doubled in 2006.91 Nevertheless, since NSH
could only provide an unaudited report for 2006 to DHSS sixty days before the start of
the re-basing year, NSH’s base rate was set using the 2005 report. 92 The lower court held
that DHSS abused its discretion.93 On appeal, DHSS argued that it did not abuse its
78
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discretion because it needs at least sixty days to calculate rates and an unaudited report
was unreliable for the calculation.94 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, reasoning that a temporary base rate could have been given to NSH until a final
rate could have been calculated using an audited report from fiscal year 2006.95 The court
further reasoned that NSH was not at fault for the delay of the report, and DHSS
approved temporary rates for two other medical centers and did not set its final rate until
the audited report for NSH was completed.96 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that an agency calculating Medicate rates may abuse its discretion by
relying on outdated data when current data would produce significantly different
results.97
State, Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Division of Workers’
Compensation, Second Injury Fund v. Tongass Business Center
In State, Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Division of Workers’
Compensation, Second Injury Fund v. Tongass Business Center,98 the supreme court held
that a party has thirty days to appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board,
which begins to run the day the decision is served on the parties. 99 Tongass Business
Center sought reimbursement from a government fund (“Fund”) for payments made to a
workers’ compensation claimant.100 The Workers’ Compensation Board granted the
petition and the Fund appealed.101 The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission
(“Commission”) denied the Fund’s motion to accept a late-filed appeal, and dismissed the
appeal.102 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the Commission’s decision. 103 The
court reasoned that, because the Fund timely requested reconsideration, its appeal was
due within thirty days after the date the request for reconsideration was denied. 104 The
court noted that a petition is considered denied if no action on a petition is taken within
the time allowed for ordering a reconsideration.105 The court further noted that the
Commission was not justified in its conclusion that the petition was denied because
action was taken on the petition.106 Thus, reversing the Commission, the supreme court
held that a party has thirty days to appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Board, which begins to run the day the decision is served on the parties.107
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State, Department of Commerce, Community & Economic Development v. Wold
In State, Department of Commerce, Community & Economic Development v. Wold,108 the
supreme court held that a desk review with conclusory statements does not provide the
substantial evidence necessary to support violations of the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice (“USPAP”).109 Wold appraised two residential properties
and a partial interest in a marina facility for a divorce proceeding110 The divorce
proceeding went to trial, where Wold’s appraisals were determined to be significantly
lower than the actual value of the assets.111 Subsequently, after Wold’s appraisals were
investigated and reviewed by the Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers, the Board
determined his appraisals violated provisions of the USPAP.112 Wold appealed the
Board’s decision and the superior court reversed seven of the Board’s eight findings,
holding that these findings were not supported by substantial evidence.113 On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision in part and reversed in part, finding
that no violations had occurred.114 It reasoned that under the substantial evidence test for
administrative factual findings, the expert-supplied desk review relied upon during the
Board’s findings was inadequate because most conclusions were given without sufficient
supportable evidence.115Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court held
that a desk review with conclusory statements does not provide the substantial evidence
necessary to support violations of the USPAP.116
Toliver v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
In Toliver v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, the supreme court held that the
State Commission for Human Rights (“Commission”) has a statutory duty to reasonably
investigate claims, and this duty implies that the Commission must make reasonable
efforts to interview witnesses.117 Pro se appellant Toliver filed a complaint with the
Human Rights Commission alleging that two stores violated his rights and privileges on
the basis of race.118 The Commission concluded that the allegations were not supported
by any substantial evidence and closed the case.119 Toliver appealed the case to the
superior court, which affirmed the decision of the Commission and concluded that
conducting interviews was not necessary because the named individuals had not been
present when the incidents occurred.120 The supreme court reversed the superior court,
holding that the Commission must make reasonable efforts to investigate.121 The court
reasoned that the Commission breached its statutory duty to conduct an impartial
investigation when it did not interview the individuals Toliver identified who could
108

278 P.3d 266 (Alaska 2012).
Id. at 268.
110
Id. at 269.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 268.
115
Id. at 272, 274, 279.
116
Id. at 268.
117
279 P.3d 619 (Alaska 2012).
118
Id. at 621.
119
Id. at 622.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 624.
109

9

corroborate his claim.122 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that the
Commission has a statutory duty to reasonably investigate claims, and this duty implies
that the Commission must make reasonable efforts to interview witnesses.123
Winterrowd v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motors Vehicles
In Winterrowd v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles,124 the
supreme court held that dismissal of a suit against the DMV is proper when a plaintiff has
not exhausted his administrative remedies.125 Winterrowd struck a moose while
driving.126 Pursuant to the DMV’s policy of suspending the licenses of uninsured drivers
who get in accidents where damages exceed $501, the DMV informed Winterrowd that
his license would be suspended.127 Winterrowd contested the suspension by claiming his
damages did not exceed $501, so the DMV scheduled an administrative hearing and
informed Winterrowd that his failure to attend would waive his right to challenge the
DMV’s ruling.128 Before he received the hearing notice, Winterrowd filed suit seeking to
keep the DMV from suspending his license, and several days before the scheduled
hearings the superior court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.129 After dismissal, Winterrowd failed to attend his hearing, and the superior
court denied his motion for reconsideration.130 On appeal, the supreme court agreed that
Winterrowd must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, and filing suit
before his hearing as well as his subsequent failure to attend it warranted dismissal of his
complaint.131 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that dismissal of a suit
against the DMV is proper when a plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative
remedies.132
Alaska Court of Appeals
Luckart v. State
In Luckart v. State,133 the court of appeals held that the general requirement that a
sentencing panel sentence a defendant in the presumptive range for their crime does not
apply when a court has referred a case to the panel because the court feels a punishment
in the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust. 134 Luckart was convicted of
attempted first-degree sexual assault but was young and had no prior record.135 The lower
court referred the case to the three-judge sentencing panel, finding it would be manifestly
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unjust to impose a sentence within the presumptive range for the offense.136 The panel
agreed, but believed it could not extend a more lenient sentence to Luckart because AS
12.55.175(e) required the panel to conclude Luckart had potential for rehabilitation in
order to sentence outside the presumptive range.137 On remand, the lower court sentenced
Luckart within statutory range, and Luckart appealed.138 The court of appeals vacated the
sentence imposed by the lower court and remanded the case to the three-judge panel to
impose a sentence, reasoning that the three-judge panel misread AS 12.55.175(e).139 The
court of appeals noted that the statute does not apply to cases that are referred to the
three-judge panel based on a finding that any sentence within the applicable presumptive
range would be manifestly unjust.140 Instead, the court reasoned that the statute only
applies to cases that are referred based on the non-statutory mitigator of exceptional
potential for rehabilitation.141 Vacating and remanding the case to the lower court, the
court of appeals held that the general requirement that a sentencing panel sentence a
defendant in the presumptive range for their crime does not apply when a court has
referred a case to the panel because the court feels a punishment in the presumptive range
would be manifestly unjust.142
BUSINESS LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Airline Support, Inc. v. ASM Capital II, L.P.
In Airline Support, Inc. v. ASM Capital II, L.P.,143 the supreme court held that there may
be a disputed question of material fact as to whether an accounting manager has apparent
authority to execute an assignment agreement.144 ASM Capital entered into an agreement
with Airline Support, Inc. (“Airline”) through Airline’s accounting manager to buy a
claim of unsecured creditors.145 Airline filed suit in superior court to have the agreement
set aside.146 The superior court declined to do so finding that Airline’s accounting
manager had apparent authority to execute the agreement on behalf of Airline.147 On
appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that there was a
genuine issue of fact as to apparent authority; specifically, the reasonableness of the third
party’s interpretation of the principal’s manifestations and the reasonableness of the third
party’s reliance.148 The court noted that, while it was reasonable to infer that Airline had
purposely put the solicitation before its accounting manager because she had the authority
136
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to transfer the claim, it is also reasonable to infer that the title “accounting manager” does
not obviously carry with it the authority to sell a company’s significant assets. 149
Reversing and remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that there may
be a disputed question of material fact as to whether an accounting manager has apparent
authority to execute an assignment agreement.150
Borgen v. A & M Motors, Inc.
In Borgen v. A & M Motors, Inc.,151 the supreme court held that, under the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), a good faith defense is not available to a
seller if the seller misrepresents a material fact about an item. 152 In 2004, Borgen
purchased a used motor home from A & M.153 The used motor home was sold to Borgen
as a 2003 model.154 However, Borgen discovered that the motor home was actually a
2002 model.155 A jury found that A & M had not engaged in unfair or deceptive acts
under the UTPA, but that it had misrepresented the model year.156 On appeal, Borgen
argued that only a material misrepresentation and subsequent damage were necessary to
establish a claim under UTPA.157 The supreme court agreed, reasoning that the language
in UTPA implied that “knowingly” did not apply to affirmative misrepresentations.158
The court further found that other courts had deemed the seller’s intent, whether good or
bad, irrelevant when dealing with affirmative misrepresentations under similar statutes.159
Vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a good
faith defense is not available to a seller if the seller misrepresents a material fact about an
item.160
Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
In Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.,161 the supreme court held that a corporation may be
awarded attorneys’ fees when litigation arises due to materially misleading proxy
statements.162 When up for re-election as director of the Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
(“CIRI”), Rude ran on an independent slate called New Alliance for the Future of CIRI,
Inc. (“New Alliance”).163 CIRI filed suit against New Alliance for including materially
misleading statements in its proxy materials.164 The superior court found that five sets of
statements in the materials were egregiously misleading, voided the New Alliance
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proxies, and awarded CIRI attorneys’ fees.165 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that
most of Rude’s claims were technically moot since he had been removed from the
board,166 that CIRI followed all statutory and common law procedures in holding its
board of directors election,167 and that attorneys’ fees were appropriately awarded.168
Affirming the superior court on all counts, the supreme court held that a corporation may
be awarded attorneys’ fees when litigation arises due to materially misleading proxy
statements.169
State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson
In State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson,170 the supreme court held
that the punitive interest rate used for tax delinquency should not be used as a
prejudgment interest rate where it would result in an unjust windfall for one party. 171 A
class of nonresident fishermen sued the State for charging nonresident fishermen three
times more than resident fishermen for permits and licenses.172 The case was appealed to
the supreme court five times.173 On one previous appeal, the supreme court determined
the State owed the nonresident fishermen a refund with interest, and that the interest
should be calculated under the rate used for delinquent taxpayers in AS 43.05.280.174 In
this fifth appeal, the supreme court found that an interest rate calculated according to its
previous holding would lead to a manifestly unjust result.175 The court reasoned the AS
43.05.280 rate was too high for the present case, seeing as the State would be required to
pay over $62 million in interest.176 Reversing its previous decision, the supreme court
held that the punitive interest rate used for tax delinquency should not be used as a
prejudgment interest rate where it would result in an unjust windfall for one party.177
CIVIL PROCEDURE
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Ahtna Tene Nené v. State, Department of Fish & Game
In Ahtna Tene Nené v. State, Department of Fish & Game,178 the supreme court held that
a pro se litigant who has a law degree but no bar license may not recover attorney’s
fees.179 In response to displeasure regarding the system that regulated hunting permits,
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the Alaska Board of Game established a new system. 180 Kenneth Manning, a pro se
litigant with a law degree, decided to challenge this new system. 181 Successful at trial
with help from the State, Manning was awarded attorney’s fees even though he was not a
bar-licensed attorney.182 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that it was improper to grant
Manning attorney’s fees.183 The court reasoned that pro se litigants without a law degree
are the same as non-bar-licensed law graduates.184 For both, it is difficult for courts to
value the time of non-lawyers performing legal services and, more importantly, allowing
non-bar attorneys to recover fees would create an incentive to not expend the time or
money necessary to be admitted to and maintain membership in a bar association.185
Vacating the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a pro se litigant who has
a law degree but no bar license may not recover attorney’s fees.186
Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough
In Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,187 the supreme court
held that when both parties prevail on main issues, the court may refrain from designating
a prevailing party, so that neither is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.188 Alliance of
Concerned Taxpayers requested a court declaration that two ballot initiatives establishing
term limits for school board members and members of the Kenai Peninsula Borough
Assembly (“Borough”) be applied to the incumbents reelected in the same election when
the initiative was approved, while the Borough argued such initiatives should not
apply.189 The superior court granted partial summary judgment to each party and as a
result chose not to designate either party as the prevailing party, so that neither was
entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.190 The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling, holding that when both parties prevail on main issues the court may refrain
from designating a prevailing party, so that neither is entitled to attorneys’ fees and
costs.191
Barton v. North Slope Borough School District
In Barton v. North Slope Borough School District,192 the supreme court ruled that expert
testimony regarding the standards used to design sports fields set forth in a manual could
appreciably assist a jury.193 Barton was injured at a high school football game when she
was struck, near the sidelines, by at least one player who ran out of bounds.194 She sued
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the school district for negligent design of the football field.195 The superior court found
the school district not negligent.196 On appeal, Barton argued that the superior court
should not have excluded an expert’s testimony concerning the use of a manual to ensure
sports fields were designed correctly.197 The supreme court held that the standards in the
manual could have appreciably assisted the jury because the jury could have used the
information to draw their own inferences of whether negligence was involved.198
However, the court found that excluding the testimony was harmless error because the
main dispute between the two sides did not concern the field’s dimensions.199 Affirming
the lower court, the supreme court ruled that expert testimony regarding the standards
used to design sports fields set forth in a manual could appreciably assist a jury.200
Friends of Willow Lake, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation & Public
Facilities
In Friends of Willow Lake, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation & Public
Facilities,201 the supreme court held that to satisfy associational standing not all the
members of an association have to participate in the suit and the matter does not have to
be a pure question of law.202 Willow Lake is a float plane facility operated by the State.203
The State issued a use plan that set forth rules for Willow Lake’s recreational and aircraft
users.204 Friends of Willow Lake (“FOWL”), a non-profit corporation whose members
are Alaska residents and Willow Lake users, filed suit.205 The superior court ruled that
FOWL lacked standing and that the use plan was properly issued.206 On appeal, the
supreme court held an association can have standing if its members would otherwise have
standing, the issues are related to the association’s purpose, and the claim and relief
requested do not require the participation of individual members.207 FOWL's
constitutional and statutory claims were mostly questions of law and did not require the
participation of individual members.208 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court
held that to satisfy associational standing not all the members of an association have to
participate in the suit and the matter does not have to be a pure question of law.209
In re Jeffery E.
In In re Jeffery E.,210 the supreme court held that a trial court can find a respondent to be
gravely disabled even if he or she appears to be functioning at the time of the finding.211
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Respondent, Jeffery, was in a catatonic state – not eating, drinking, or sleeping – for
several days.212 His family brought him to a hospital and after he was put on medication,
his condition improved.213 Jeffery, however, lacked insight into his prior condition and
his doctors feared that if he were released he would go off his medication and return to a
catatonic state.214 The hospital filed a petition for an involuntary thirty-day
commitment.215 At the hearing, Jeffery appeared to be “functioning,” yet the superior
court found him to be gravely disabled.216 Reviewing the superior court’s decision for
clear error, the supreme court upheld the finding.217 The court reasoned that recent
behavior is probative as to whether a respondent is gravely disabled and that a
determination of gravely disabled is forward-looking.218 Because Jeffery had very
recently experienced catatonia and because it was likely that his catatonia could reoccur
in the near future, the superior court did not err in finding Jeffery to be gravely
disabled.219 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a trial court can find
a respondent to be gravely disabled even if he or she appears to be functioning at the time
of the finding.220
Smith v. State
In Smith v. State,221 the supreme court held that statutes of limitations apply to
constitutional claims.222 Smith filed a takings action against the State over twenty-five
years after a sawmill he operated on United States Forest Service property was acquired
by the State and conveyed to a third party. 223 The lower court dismissed Smith’s claim,
finding that under any statute of limitations the claim would be time-barred.224 On appeal,
Smith argued that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims involving constitutional
rights.225 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that statutes of
limitations apply to all civil claims.226 The court further reasoned that the continuing
violation doctrine was inapplicable because Smith did not allege any ongoing series of
incidents.227 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that statutes of limitations
apply to constitutional claims.228
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Thompson v. Cooper
In Thompson v. Cooper,229 the supreme court held that expert opinions based on practical
experience in the relevant field are not subject to Daubert analysis.230 Cooper crashed his
truck into Thompson’s truck and Thompson subsequently filed suit.231 At trial,
Thompson moved to offer the testimony of one his physicians regarding the back pain he
experienced since the accident.232 The testimony consisted of the physician inferring,
based on Thompson’s statements that his symptoms began after the accident, that he was
injured in the accident.233 The superior court excluded the evidence, reasoning that it was
merely a common sense inference and not expert testimony.234 On appeal, Cooper
insisted that the testimony should be kept out because it would fail a Daubert analysis.235
The supreme court reversed, explaining that Daubert analysis only applies to expert
testimony based on technical or scientific research.236 Another acceptable form of expert
testimony is testimony based on experience, to which Daubert does not apply.237 In
Thompson’s case, the physician was an experience-based expert who had substantial
experience with injuries similar to Thompson’s.238 Because causation was a central issue
and the exclusion of the testimony could have had a substantial effect on the verdict, the
supreme court held that the testimony should have been admitted.239 Reversing, the
supreme court held that expert opinions based on practical experience in the relevant field
are not subject to Daubert analysis.240
Alaska Court of Appeals
Andrews v. State
In Andrews v. State,241 the court of appeals held that the testimony of a nurse who
performed a sexual assault examination on a victim is admissible even without pre-trial
notice where the defendant knows the nurse may testify and does not argue that he is
surprised by the content of her testimony.242 Andrews was charged with second-degree
sexual assault for engaging in sexual penetration of T.P. while she was incapacitated.243
Prior to trial, the State did not list the nurse who examined T.P. as an expert witness. 244
Andrews moved to preclude the nurse from offering any expert testimony, but the
superior court judge said he would admit the nurse’s testimony unless Andrews indicated
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to the judge that he was surprised by the content of the testimony. 245 Andrews did not
argue that the content of the nurse’s testimony surprised him.246 On appeal, the court of
appeals agreed that the testimony should be allowed, reasoning that when a defendant
was aware of the substance of an expert witness’s testimony, such testimony was
admissible even without pre-trial notice if there were no unfair surprise.247 Affirming the
superior court, the court of appeals held that the testimony of a nurse who performed a
sexual assault examination on a victim is admissible even without pre-trial notice where
the defendant knows the nurse may testify and does not argue that he is surprised by the
content of her testimony.248
Rogers v. State
In Rogers v. State,249 the court of appeals held that evidence of a similar crime committed
by a third-party in the same general area as the crime allegedly committed by the
defendant should be excluded unless there is a direct connection between this thirdparty’s crime and the defendant’s alleged crime.250 Rogers was charged with shooting
three people, and was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of
attempted first-degree murder.251 On appeal, Rogers argued that he should have been
allowed to present evidence that a similar crime occurred in the same general area that
could have cast doubt on his guilt concerning the shootings.252 The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that this evidence was too speculative.253
The court reasoned that witness testimony regarding a light-colored sedan and a man in
dark clothing at both crime scenes did not provide sufficient reason to believe that that
man, not Rogers, committed both crimes.254 Affirming the lower court, the court of
appeals held that evidence of a similar crime committed by a third-party in the same
general area as the crime allegedly committed by the defendant should be excluded
unless there is a direct connection between this third-party’s crime and the defendant’s
alleged crime.255

245

Id.
Id.
247
Id. at 782.
248
Id. at 781.
249
280 P.3d 582 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
250
Id. at 588.
251
Id. at 584.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 588.
254
Id. at 587.
255
Id. at 588.
246

18

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
United States v. Henry
In United States v. Henry,256 the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms does not extend to possession of a homemade machine gun.257 Officers seized
a loaded assault rifle that had been converted into a machine gun by Henry. 258 Henry was
convicted by a jury for knowingly possessing a machine gun in district court.259 Henry
appealed, arguing in part that the Second Amendment protected his right to possess a
homemade machine gun in his home.260 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that machine
guns are not protected by the Second Amendment.261 The court reasoned that machine
guns are highly dangerous and unusual weapons, and that every circuit court to address
the issue has held that the Second Amendment does not protect such weapons.262
Affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms does not extend to possession of a homemade machine gun.263
United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.
In Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 264 the district court held that it may be in the
public interest to enjoin protests from taking place around sea vessels.265 Shell Oil
Company (“Shell”) filed a motion to enjoin Greenpeace from engaging in certain illegal
acts at sea against Shell vessels.266 Shell submitted evidence that it was under threat of
injury due to Greenpeace’s “Stop Shell” campaign, which could be found over web pages
and other materials.267 Greenpeace did not indicate that the organization would not
attempt tortious or unlawful acts against Shell.268 The court found that Shell had shown
that it was likely Greenpeace would engage in these acts, and moved on to determine
whether it was constitutional to enjoin protests in safety zones around Shell’s vessels.269
The court held that such an injunction was proper, noting that public sidewalks are the
quintessential example of a public forum, while the ports and seas of the United States
are not such a forum.270 Instead, the court explained that there is a significant public
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interest in the safe operation of marine commerce in these areas. 271 Thus, the court held
that it may be in the public interest to enjoin protests from taking place around sea
vessels.272
Alaska Supreme Court
Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough
In Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,273 the supreme court
held that (1) voter approval was not required to increase sales taxes to three percent due
to prior voter approval of a sales tax of up to three percent, and (2) an ordinance requiring
voter approval for capital projects costing more than one million dollars violated the
Alaska Constitution.274 In 2005, the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly (“Borough”)
enacted an ordinance raising the sales tax rate from two to three percent, and the
Borough’s voters passed an initiative requiring voter approval for any capital projects
costing over one million dollars.275 The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (“ACT”)
brought suit in superior court challenging the sales tax increase and seeking enforcement
of the voter initiative, but the superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough
on each matter.276 On appeal, the ACT argued that the ordinance increasing sales tax was
not permissible under AS 29.45.670 because it had not been approved by voters, and that
the ordinance requiring voter approval of capital projects did not violate the Alaska
Constitution because it did not explicitly make or repeal any appropriation. 277 The
supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the sales tax ordinance was valid because voters
had authorized an increase of up to three percent in 1964 and that defeat of a 2006
referendum which would have repealed the increase constituted further ratification.278 As
to the second ordinance, the court determined that requiring voter approval for all capital
projects with costs exceeding one million dollars was invalid because this action would
compromise the Borough’s ability to utilize resources and allocate funds for competing
uses effectively.279 Affirming, the supreme court held that (1) voter approval was not
required to increase sales taxes to three percent due to prior voter consent of a sales tax of
up to three percent, and (2) an ordinance requiring voter approval for capital projects
costing more than one million dollars violated the Alaska Constitution.280
Holiday Alaska, Inc. v. State, Division of Corporations
In Holiday Alaska, Inc. v. State, Division of Corporations,281 the supreme court held that
a state statute does not violate due process by imposing fines on a store licensed to sell
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tobacco when an employee is convicted of selling tobacco to a minor.282 Holiday Alaska,
Inc. (“Holiday”) was licensed to sell tobacco in stores across Alaska, but five stores were
cited for illegally selling tobacco to minors, each incident resulting in a conviction of the
employee.283 The superior court upheld the decision of an Administrative Law Judge to
impose a $300 civil penalty and license suspension, concluding that Holiday was unable
to rebut the statutory presumption of negligence established by the convictions.284
Holiday challenged the statute under which the stores were charged, arguing that it
violated due process because it denied a meaningful hearing and prevented the defendant
from challenging the presumption of negligence on the part of the company.285 The
supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the amended version of the statute actually
improved procedural protections and did in fact allow the licensee to challenge the
presumption of negligence.286 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a
state statute does not violate due process by imposing fines on a store licensed to sell
tobacco when an employee is convicted of selling tobacco to a minor.287
Khan v. State
In Khan v. State,288 the supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution requires that, in
order to convict a defendant, a jury agree unanimously on the specific criminal conduct
committed by a defendant.289 Kahn was charged with one count of perjury for allegedly
making four false statements on a financial document.290 Kahn claimed he did not make
the false statements knowingly.291 The superior court instructed the jury that to find Kahn
guilty of perjury, the jurors did not all have to agree as to which statements were false, all
that was necessary was that each juror find him guilty with respect to at least one
statement.292 Kahn was convicted and his conviction was affirmed by the court of
appeals.293 Kahn appealed, arguing that a unanimous jury verdict is a constitutional
right.294 Reversing, the supreme court held that jury unanimity is required, and explained
that jury unanimity means that jurors must all agree as to the defendant’s guilt and
specific criminal conduct.295 The court further noted that jurors can disagree as to
alternate theories of a crime, but not as to alternate crimes.296 The court concluded the
Alaska Constitution’s due process protects the criminal defendant’s right to have jurors
unanimously agree on the specific underlying criminal conduct.297 Reversing the court of
appeals, the supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution requires that, in order to
282
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convict a defendant, a jury agree unanimously on the specific criminal conduct
committed by a defendant.298
Larson v. State, Department of Corrections
In Larson v. State, Dep’t of Corr.,299 the supreme court held that prison officials must
provide reasonable accommodation to a prisoner’s serious medical needs to avoid
deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and such accommodation
may not be satisfied by medical testing alone.300 Larson was incarcerated and claimed to
suffer from paruresis, a condition that makes it extremely difficult to urinate in the
presence of others.301 He complained repeatedly to prison officials about the pain he
endured during mandatory urinalysis tests in which he was forced to urinate in the
presence of a guard.302 Larson’s grievances were denied and, acting pro se, he filed suit
against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.303 The superior court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that
the fact that the officials had ordered medical evaluations of Larson’s condition showed
they were not deliberately indifferent.304 On appeal, the supreme court reversed and
remanded, holding that inconclusive medical testing of a prisoner does not, in itself,
avoid the possibility of deliberate indifference.305 The supreme court held that prison
officials must provide reasonable accommodation to a prisoner’s serious medical needs to
avoid deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and such
accommodation may not be satisfied by medical testing alone.306
Ross v. State, Department of Revenue
In Ross v. State, Department of Revenue,307 the supreme court held that the Alaska statute
disqualifying anyone who was absent for ten consecutive years from the state from
receiving dividends is constitutional.308 Ross was absent from the state since 1990, but
maintained Alaska residency and received a permanent fund dividend each year.309 In
1998, the Alaska Legislature amended the dividend qualifications to provide that anyone
who was allowably absent for ten consecutive years would no longer be eligible for
dividends.310 Ross was absent for ten consecutive years, and was thus denied of dividend
payment.311 Ross appealed and the denial was upheld at an informal agency appeal, a
formal agency appeal, and by the superior court.312 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s judgment, reasoning that the ten-year rule is fairly and substantially
298

Id. at 897–99.
284 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2012).
300
Id. at 9.
301
Id. at 4.
302
Id.
303
Id. at 5.
304
Id. at 9.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
292 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2012).
308
Id. at 915.
309
Id. at 908.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id. at 909.
299

22

related to the legitimate state interests of limiting dividends to permanent Alaska
residents and preventing fraud and also the ten-year rule is rationally related to the
legitimate state purpose of reducing administrative burdens.313 Thus, affirming the
superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Alaska statute disqualifying
anyone who was absent for ten consecutive years from the state from receiving dividends
is constitutional.314
CONTRACT LAW
top
United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Millo v. Delius
In Millo v. Delius,315 the district court held that adult children are not presumed to be
dependents under Alaska’s wrongful death statute.316 Bret Millo was fatally shot during a
guided hunting trip by another hunter.317 His wife filed a complaint claiming the hunter
acted with reckless indifference seeking, in part, wrongful death damages for her adult
daughters.318 The issue before the court was whether Millo’s three adult daughters could
be considered statutory beneficiaries under Alaska’s wrongful death statute.319 The court
granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the three daughters were
economically independent from their father and thus not statutory beneficiaries.320 The
court recognized that generally Alaska’s wrongful death statute presumes a surviving
spouse or minor child of the victim is a dependent, whereas dependency must be
established for all other individuals.321 Granting summary judgment to the defendant, the
court held that adult children are not presumed to be dependents under Alaska’s wrongful
death statute.322
Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska Interstate Construction, LLC v. Pacific Diversified Investments, Inc.
In Alaska Interstate Construction, LLC v. Pacific Diversified Investments, Inc.,323 the
supreme court held that where there are claims for violations of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“UTPA”), such claims can only be preempted by laws which specifically
address the conduct at issue.324 Pacific Diversified Investments (“PDI”) entered into an
agreement to lease two aircraft to Alaska Interstate Construction (“AIC”) for an hourly
313
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fee.325 Subsequently, without prior approval, PDI began charging monthly fees to AIC for
the use of one aircraft, resulting in overpayments.326 At trial, the jury found that PDI
committed unfair and deceptive acts under the UTPA, awarding AIC $7.3 million in
damages.327 The superior court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”)
nullifying the $7.3 million award, concluding that the conduct was exempt from the
UTPA because it dealt with aviation, an industry regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”).328 Reversing, the supreme court held that that the superior court
erroneously granted a JNOV because the UTPA was not exempted by other aviation
laws.329 The supreme court reasoned that regulations under FAA law focus on aviation
safety, not aircraft leasing, and without regulations specifically regulating the activity at
issue, the UTPA would not be exempted.330 Reversing, the supreme court held that where
there are claims for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”), such claims
can only be preempted by laws which specifically address the conduct at issue.331
Kiernan v. Creech
In Kiernan v. Creech,332 the supreme court held that, despite the statute of frauds, a party
may invoke promissory estoppel and part performance to enforce an oral agreement if the
party materially relied on the agreement to his or her detriment. 333 Kiernan and Creech
each owned separate towing companies and entered an oral agreement to share a lot out
of which to operate their separate businesses.334 Because Kiernan owed money to the
IRS, the lot was placed exclusively in Creech’s name.335 Kiernan split the expenses for
the lot, paying half of all the associated costs.336 Kiernan, however, continued to
experience problems with the IRS.337 Kiernan and Creech’s relationship soured and
Kiernan brought suit against Creech.338 The lower court dismissed Kiernan’s claims,
holding that the statute of frauds bars oral co-ownership agreements and no exception to
the statute of frauds applies.339 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that if Kiernan was
able to prove the terms of the oral agreement by clear and convincing evidence then the
oral agreement may be specific enough to support promissory estoppel.340 The court also
reasoned that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds may be available
when a party significantly changes its position in reliance on the oral agreement.341
Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that, despite the statute of frauds, a
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party may invoke promissory estoppel and part performance to enforce an oral agreement
if the party materially relied on the agreement to his or her detriment.342
Perotti v. Corrections Corp. of America
In Perotti v. Corrections Corp. of America,343 the supreme court held that a prisoner does
not have the right to receive monetary damages for breach of contract under the Cleary
Final Settlement Agreement.344 Perotti was a prisoner in the Alaska Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) and contested the ramifications of violation of the Cleary
Settlement.345 The Cleary Settlement provides that if overcrowding occurs in the prisons,
then the DOC must present a plan to the superior court to reduce the population of
prisoners.346 Perotti was placed in segregated housing.347 He filed a claim against the
Corrections Corporation, alleging that it was in breach of the terms of its contract during
the time that Perotti had been segregated.348 The lower court held that Perotti, as a thirdparty beneficiary, lacked standing to bring the claim.349 Affirming the lower court, the
supreme court reasoned that, as a Cleary class member and third-party beneficiary,
Perotti was not entitled to damages.350 The court reasoned that Perotti would not be
entitled to compensatory, liquidated, or punitive damages because these damages do not
extend to third-party beneficiaries under contract law.351 Therefore, affirming the lower
court, the supreme court held that a prisoner does not have the right to receive monetary
damages for breach of contract under the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement.352
CRIMINAL LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
McGraw v. Cox
In McGraw v. Cox,353 the supreme court held that threats amounting to attempted
coercion are sufficient to justify a domestic violence protective order.354 When Cox and
McGraw’s relationship ended, Cox was granted a temporary domestic violence order, and
then sought a long-term domestic violence protective order on the basis that McGraw had
coerced her with various threats that would jeopardize her ongoing custody dispute with
her ex-husband.355 The superior court granted the order, finding that McGraw’s
threatened to reveal information that Cox had “brainwashed” her children and allowed
342
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one child to fondle her breasts.356 McGraw appealed, arguing there was insufficient
evidence to support the finding.357 The supreme court found that McGraw did not commit
the crime of coercion because Cox was never compelled to act in response to the threats;
however, the court held his actions constituted an attempt to coerce Cox, which was
sufficient to support a domestic violence protective order.358 Affirming the lower court,
the supreme court held that threats amounting to attempted coercion are sufficient to
justify a domestic violence protective order.359
Nelson v. State
In Nelson v. State,360 the supreme court held that a defense counsel’s invocation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during a post-conviction relief
proceeding based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not, by itself, rebut
the presumption of counsel’s competence or shift the burden of proof to the defense. 361
Nelson was convicted by a jury of five counts of sexual abuse of minors and his
convictions were upheld on appeal.362 He retained new counsel and filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, alleging thirty-five counts of ineffective assistance of counsel.363
Nelson’s former counsel invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and refused to answer questions for a required affidavit supporting
Nelson’s claim.364 The superior court subsequently dismissed thirty-four counts in
Nelson’s petition.365 The court of appeals upheld the decision, and asserted that no
adverse inference could be drawn from the former counsel’s invocation of privilege.366
On appeal, the supreme court held that a defense counsel’s invocation of Fifth
Amendment privilege in a post-conviction proceeding will not generally give rise to an
adverse inference, but that it may give rise to a permissible adverse inference if he refuses
to testify against specific evidence offered against him.367 Affirming, the supreme court
held that a defense counsel’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination during a post-conviction relief proceeding based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel does not by itself rebut the presumption of counsel’s competence or
shift the burden of proof to the defense.368
Rofkar v. State
In Rofkar v. State,369 the supreme court held that Alaska’s double jeopardy clause may be
violated if a defendant receives separate convictions for possessing drugs and for
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maintaining a dwelling or building to keep those same drugs.370 Rofkar was arrested and
charged with four felony counts: manufacturing one ounce or more of marijuana,
possessing marijuana of one pound or more, possessing twenty-five or more marijuana
plants, and maintaining a dwelling for the keeping of a controlled substance.371 The court
of appeals merged the first three claims, but refused to merge the maintaining charge with
the other three, leaving Rofkar with two felony charges.372 Rofkar raised the issue of
double jeopardy on appeal, but did not argue that the controlling precedent should be
overruled or distinguished until his reply brief.373 The court of appeals thus refused to
hear the double jeopardy issue on the merits.374 The supreme court vacated the court of
appeals’ decision and remanded, reasoning that the court of appeal’s categorical approach
to double jeopardy in possession/maintaining crimes may violate case law and
constitutional law.375 Vacating and remanding, the supreme court held that Alaska’s
double jeopardy clause may be violated if a defendant receives separate convictions for
possessing drugs and for maintaining a dwelling or building to keep those same drug.376
State v. Corbett
In State v. Corbett,377 the supreme court held that an immunized witness does not retain
the ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, and the accompanying right
to refuse to testify, based on the possibility that the witness may be prosecuted for
committing perjury during that immunized testimony.378 Corbett was accused of
strangling his son Dupri.379 Dupri was granted immunity but refused to testify, invoking
his privilege against self-incrimination under both the Alaska Constitution and the United
States Constitution.380 The superior court found that because Dupri intended to testify
that his father had not assaulted him, and the State would likely find such testimony
perjurious, then Dupri could refuse to testify due to the risk of self-incrimination.381 The
supreme court held that while immunity is intended to shield witnesses from offering
perjuries testimony and self-incrimination, immunity does not protect witnesses from
future perjury, and thus a witness that has been granted immunity cannot refuse to
testify.382 Reversing, the supreme court held that an immunized witness does not retain
the ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, and the accompanying right
to refuse to testify, based on the possibility that the witness may be prosecuted for
committing perjury during that immunized testimony.383

370

Id. at 1143.
Id.at 1141.
372
Id.
373
Id.
374
Id.
375
Id. at1143.
376
Id.
377
286 P.3d 772 (Alaska 2012).
378
Id. at 774.
379
Id. at 773.
380
Id.
381
Id. at 773–74.
382
Id. at 776.
383
Id.
371

27

State v. Gibson
In State v. Gibson,384 the supreme court held that the police may have reasonable belief
that a warrantless search is necessary where (1) the police respond to a domestic violence
call and find that serious violence has occurred, and (2) it is unclear whether all injured
parties are accounted for.385 Gibson’s girlfriend called 911 and told police Gibson was
threatening to stab her.386 When police arrived at Gibson’s trailer, they detained both
known parties, and then entered the trailer to determine if there were any injured
parties.387 Upon entry, police discovered evidence of methamphetamine
manufacturing.388 Gibson was convicted of methamphetamine related charges after a
motion to suppress the evidence of the meth lab was overruled.389 Vacating, the court of
appeals concluded that the police did not have an objectively reasonable belief of
emergency when they searched the trailer.390 Reversing, the supreme court concluded that
the court of appeals took a narrower view of what constitutes an emergency than Alaska
law requires, and held that it is sufficient if the police have good reason to believe there
might be someone injured on the premises.391 The court reasoned that the police have
wide latitude when acting out of safety concerns, particularly when the situation involves
violence.392 Reversing, the supreme court held that the police may have reasonable belief
that a warrantless search is necessary where (1) the police respond to a domestic violence
call and find that serious violence has occurred, and (2) it is unclear whether all injured
parties are accounted for.393
Yi v. Yang
In Yi v. Yang,394 the supreme court held that when a police officer has probable cause to
instigate a felony arrest, any procedural deficiencies in a corresponding citizen’s arrest
are irrelevant.395 Police officers reported to a premise after numerous emergency phone
calls by several individuals.396 Though testimony was inconsistent, it was determined that
the manager of the premises had served eviction papers on Yi.397 As the manager was
leaving the premises, Yi used a broom handle to break the front and back windows of the
manager’s vehicle, and also struck the manager’s wrist and broke his wristwatch.398 The
manager said that he was in fear for his life, and the police detained Yi as part of a
citizen’s arrest.399 Yi challenged the citizen’s arrest, and argued that he was falsely
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arrested because it had not met procedural standards.400 The superior court granted
summary judgment and dismissed the suit in favor of the police, reasoning that the arrest
was justified by probable cause that Yi had committed or was committing a felony,
regardless of the fact that Yi was actually detained in a citizen’s arrest.401 The supreme
court affirmed the lower court and held that when a police officer has probable cause to
instigate a felony arrest, any procedural deficiencies in a corresponding citizen’s arrest
are irrelevant.402
Alaska Court of Appeals
Ahvakana v. State
In Ahvakana v. State,403 the court of appeals held that warrantless entry is justified when
police reasonably believe there is an emergency and immediate need for assistance.404
The police responded to a domestic violence report.405 Black answered the door with cuts
and blood on her face, and she told the police that Ahvakana was not there.406 Police then
entered the home and arrested Ahvakana who was hiding in a closet.407 At trial,
Ahvakana was convicted of fourth-degree assault.408 Ahvakana appealed, arguing that the
police had committed a warrantless entry.409 Affirming, the court of appeals held that
warrantless entries such as the entry in this case are justified when performed under the
emergency aid exception.410 The court noted that the exception requires police to have
reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need
for their assistance for the protection of life or property. 411 The court reasoned that police
had reasonable ground to enter because the police were responding to complaints of
yelling and crying, Black answered the door with cuts, and a concern existed that there
might be other victims.412 Affirming, the court of appeals held that warrantless entry is
justified when police reasonably believe there is an emergency and immediate need for
assistance.413
Bachmeier v. State
In Bachmeier v. State,414 the court of appeals held that an inmate’s self-defense claim
requires a showing that the inmate reasonably believed an officer was about to strike him
without justification.415 Bachmeier was moving laundry when a corrections officer
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demanded some materials in the laundry basket.416 A physical confrontation ensued, and
Bachmeier claimed self-defense.417 Bachmeier was convicted of assault. 418 On appeal,
the court of appeals held that for an inmate to prove they were acting in self-defense, they
do not need to show that the officer was using unlawful force against them.419 Rather, the
court noted that a reasonable belief that the unlawful use of force is imminent would meet
the requirements for a self-defense claim.420 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the
court of appeals held that an inmate’s self-defense claim requires a showing that the
inmate reasonably believed an officer was about to strike him without justification.421
Benson v. State
In Benson v. State,422 the court of appeals held that it is not plain error a court to refuse to
appoint conflict counsel, sua sponte, to a defendant in proceedings to determine whether
the defendant is financially qualified for court-appointed counsel.423 Benson was charged
with misconduct involving a controlled substance in the third degree. 424 At his
arraignment, upon Benson’s request, a superior court judge appointed the Office of
Public Advocacy to represent Benson.425 However, the Office of Public Advocacy filed
two motions in superior court to withdraw from representation of Benson on the grounds
that he was financially ineligible for representation.426 The superior court judge
determined that Benson was financially capable of paying for an attorney and granted the
second motion.427 Benson subsequently represented himself at trial and was convicted.428
On appeal, Benson argued that the determination of his eligibility for appointed counsel
was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and therefore both the United States
and Alaska Constitutions gave him a right to court-appointed counsel as an indigent
defendant.429 The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that applicable case law did not
support his assertion that this determination was a critical stage of the proceedings
against him.430 Moreover, the court found that because Benson did not argue in superior
court that he was constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in superior court,
the issue could only be reviewed for plain error.431 Affirming, the court of appeals held
that it is not plain error a court to refuse to appoint conflict counsel, sua sponte, to a
defendant in proceedings to determine whether the defendant is financially qualified for
court-appointed counsel.432
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Christian v. State
In Christian v. State,433 the court of appeals held that defendants have no constitutional
right to serve as co-counsel in their own trials or to receive hybrid representation when
they are represented by counsel.434 Christian was sentenced to 106 years in prison for
various charges.435 At trial, the judge rejected Christian’s requests to serve as co-counsel
in his trial and to personally deliver the opening statement because (1) he did not have
sufficient time to efficiently conduct the necessary research; and (2) he would be
permitted to make statements about the case without taking the stand and undergoing
cross-examination.436 Reviewing for clear error, the court of appeals upheld the trial
judge’s decision.437 Noting the distinction between pro se defendants seeking assistance
from counsel and defendants that are represented by counsel but who desire to serve as
co-counsel, the court of appeals held that defendants like Christian have a lesser need for
hybrid representation and that trial judges can take various factors, including timeliness,
into consideration when deciding such requests.438 Affirming, the court of appeals held
that defendants have no constitutional right to serve as co-counsel in their own trials or to
receive hybrid representation when they are represented by counsel. 439
Collins v. State
In Collins v. State,440 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s case should be referred
to a three-judge sentencing panel if the defendant can sufficiently demonstrate that he
does not have a history of unprosecuted sexual offenses, or that the he has “normal” or
“good” prospects for rehabilitation.441 Collins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault
and sentenced to twenty years of incarceration.442 In 2006, the legislature had increased
the sentencing ranges for sexual offenders, and Collins was subject to a sentencing range
of twenty to thirty years.443 In order to avoid the presumptive minimum, Collins asked the
judge to send his case to a three-judge panel but his request was denied.444 Reversing, the
court of appeals held that defendants convicted of sex offenses should be able to obtain
referrals to the three-judge sentencing panel if they refute that they are atypically
dangerous, and that they have atypically poor prospects for rehabilitation.445 The court
reasoned that the legislature’s choice of presumptive sentencing range depended on
underlying assumptions, and that a defendant able to refute such assumptions may
receive sentencing from a panel.446 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that a
defendant’s case should be referred to a three-judge panel if the defendant can show that
433
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he does not have a history of unprosecuted sexual offenses, or that the he has “normal”
prospects for rehabilitation.447
Dickie v. State
In Dickie v. State,448 the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of
“nonconsensual” does not require an element of coercion or force.449 Dickie knocked on
the front door of the Petersens’ house one night holding a bag of beer and asking for
someone named Sherry.450 They informed him that nobody of that name lived there, but
over the next several weeks he kept returning to put food on their front porch. 451 The
Petersons warned Dickie that they would call the police if he returned.452 Later, when the
family saw Dickie enter their yard and crouch down with a large gun, Mr. Petersen called
the police, who apprehended Dickie at his home.453 Dickie was convicted of three
charges, including a count of first-degree stalking.454 On appeal, Dickie contended that
the definition of “nonconsensual” used by the stalking statute was unconstitutionally
broad and required an element of coercion or force.455 The court of appeals disagreed
with Dickie, reasoning that his first visit to the Petersens’ residence, during which he was
informed that nobody named Sherry lived at the home, was sufficient notice that any
continued contact with the family would be without their consent.456 Affirming the lower
court, the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of “nonconsensual” does not
require an element of coercion or force.457
Eberhardt v. State
In Eberhardt v. State,458 the court of appeals held that the date of deferred prosecution
does not count as the date of prior conviction for purposes of the felony DUI statute.459 In
1994, Eberhardt was accepted into a deferred prosecution program following his first
DUI charge in Washington.460 In 2004, he was convicted of the DUI after he violated the
terms of the program.461 In 2009, the superior court convicted him of felony DUI because
he had two prior DUI convictions within the preceding ten years, counting the 2004
conviction rather than the 1994 deferred prosecution.462 He appealed arguing that the
1994 order accepting him into deferred prosecution program qualified as a conviction,
outside of the ten-year look-back period for felony DUI.463 Affirming the superior court,
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the court of appeals found that the statute and previous court decisions did not consider a
deferred prosecution as a conviction.464 The court held that a formal finding of guilt was
not entered until 2004.465 Thus, the court of appeals held that the date of deferred
prosecution does not count as the date of prior conviction when deferred prosecution was
later terminated for purposes of counting prior convictions for a felony DUI charge.466
Grossman v. State
In Grossman v. State,467 the court of appeals held that a DUI arrestee’s right to contact an
attorney before consenting to a breath test does not permit the defendant to interrupt the
testing process after the fifteen minute pre-test observation period.468 Grossman was
arrested for driving under the influence and was taken to the police station for a breath
test.469 An officer informed Grossman of his right to contact an attorney at the beginning
of the fifteen minute pre-test observation period, but Grossman made no calls.470
Grossman was subsequently uncooperative in providing an adequate breath sample.471 At
the point the officer was prepared to charge Grossman with breath test refusal, Grossman
requested that he be able to contact an attorney, further interrupting the test.472 The
officer refused and charged Grossman with both DUI and the crime of breath test
refusal.473 On appeal, Grossman argued that the officer violated his rights by refusing to
interrupt the breath test to allow Grossman to contact an attorney. 474 The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that a DUI arrestee’s right to contact an
attorney before consenting to a breath test does not permit the defendant to interrupt the
testing process after the fifteen minute pre-test observation period.475
Harvey v. State
In Harvey v State,476 the court of appeals held that privately retained attorneys, like courtappointed attorneys, must engage in meaningful consultation with a defendant when the
defendant demonstrates an interest in pursuing an appeal or when the attorney should
reasonably know that a rational defendant would want to appeal.477 Harvey was
sentenced for sexual abuse, and claimed to engage in discussion with his counsel about
pursuing an appeal, but his counsel took no action following the sentencing.478 Harvey
petitioned the superior court for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective
counsel from his attorney, but the superior court denied Harvey's petition, and Harvey
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appealed.479 The court of appeals held that privately retained attorneys are held to the
same standard as court-appointed attorneys, and thus Harvey’s attorney did not have a
lessor obligation to engage in meaningful consultation with Harvey about the possibility
of seeking post-judgment remedies.480 Reversing the superior court, the court of appeals
held that privately retained attorneys, like court- appointed attorneys, must engage in
meaningful consultation with a defendant when the defendant demonstrates an interest in
pursuing an appeal or when the attorney should reasonably know that a rational defendant
would want to appeal.481
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,482 the court of appeals held that prior specific acts of violence may be
admissible where they are introduced to show the reasonableness of another party’s use
of defensive force.483 Johnson was charged with, among other things, attempted firstdegree murder for cutting three individuals, including Moulder, with a box cutter.484 At
trial, Johnson claimed self-defense against all three victims.485 The superior court did not
allow Johnson to introduce evidence of Moulder’s statement that he had attacked a
neighbor the night before.486 Johnson appealed.487 The court of appeals reversed the
superior court’s judgment, reasoning that where Johnson was aware of Moulder’s past
acts of violence, and evidence of those acts of violence was offered to prove the
reasonableness of Johnson’s use of defensive force, evidence of Moulder’s specific acts
is not barred.488 The court reasoned that the evidence was not being used as character
evidence but to show the reasonableness of Johnson’s use of defensive force. 489 Thus,
reversing the superior court, the court of appeals held that prior specific acts of violence
may be admissible where they are introduced to show the reasonableness of another
party’s use of defensive force.490
Joseph v. State
In Joseph v. State,491 the court of appeals held that separate convictions for first-degree
sexual assault do not merge when there are distinct types of penetration involved and
there is a break in time between their occurrences, but convictions for second-degree
sexual assault can merge with convictions for first-degree sexual assault.492 Joseph
forcibly performed nonconsensual oral sex on his wife.493 He then attacked his wife when
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she began to struggle.494 After a period, he then forced her to engage in genital
intercourse.495 Joseph was convicted on three counts of first-degree sexual assault and
multiple counts of second-degree sexual assault, and he appealed.496 Affirming, the court
of appeals reasoned that the first-degree convictions do not merge because distinct types
of sexual penetration support separate convictions for sexual assault, and there was a
break between the penetrations that occurred before and after Joseph was interrupted by
the children walking into the room.497 The court also held that Joseph’s second-degree
sexual assault convictions merge with his first-degree sexual assault convictions because
when two sexual acts are performed as part of a single transaction with a single incident
of sexual penetration, conviction should be based on the most serious contact, which in
this case is the sexual penetration.498 The court of appeals held that separate convictions
for first-degree sexual assault do not merge when there are distinct types of penetration
involved and there is a break in time between their occurrences, but convictions for
second-degree sexual assault can merge with convictions for first-degree sexual
assault.499
Lawrence v. State
In Lawrence v. State,500 the court of appeals held that an individual who steals a container
can be convicted of stealing the contents of the container even when he or she was
ignorant of those contents at the time of the taking.501 Lawrence stole a purse containing
the victim’s debit card and social security card.502 AS § 11.81.900(b)(1) defines these
cards as “access devices,” and stealing them is second-degree theft.503 Lawrence was
convicted by a jury of two counts for stealing the access devices. 504 On appeal, she
argued that the court erred by instructing the jury they could infer Lawrence’s intent to
steal the contents of the purse based on her theft of the purse itself.505 She contended that
this instruction violated the rule that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of an offence, including the relevant mental states.506 The court of appeals
affirmed the jury’s verdict, reasoning that Alaska precedent and authority from other
jurisdictions permit conviction under these circumstances when the contents of the
container are not unusual.507 The court declared that when the probable contents of a
particular kind of container are common knowledge, then the jury may rightly infer from
a person’s intentional theft of the container that she also intended to steal the contents. 508
The court did not decide whether this rule applies when the container’s contents are
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unusual.509 Affirming, the court of appeals held that an individual who steals a container
can be convicted of stealing the contents of the container even when he or she was
ignorant of those contents at the time of the taking.510
Maillelle v. State
In Maillelle v. State,511 the court of appeals held that a court can require a defendant
convicted of a crime to pay restitution to Alaska’s Medicaid program when that program
has paid for the medical expenses incurred by the victim of the crime.512 Maillelle pled
guilty to second-degree assault after striking her daughter with a truck. 513 Maillelle’s
daughter suffered extensive injuries, and incurred nearly $102,000 in medical expenses,
which were paid for by Alaska’s Medicaid program.514 The superior court ordered
Maillelle to pay restitution to the state under AS 12.55.045(a).515 On appeal, Maillelle
argues that the state’s Medicaid program was neither a victim of the crime nor a provider
of medical services, and therefore the statute did not authorize the superior court to order
her to pay restitution to the program.516 The court of appeals disagreed with Maillelle and
affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that because the program lost money as
a result of the crime, it was a “victim or other person injured by the offense” within the
meaning of the statute.517 Moreover, the court found that it did not matter that the
program was not a provider of medical services because the doctors and other staff that
provided the services were paid for by Medicaid.518 Affirming, the court of appeals held
that a court can require a defendant convicted of a crime to pay restitution to the state’s
Medicaid program when Medicaid has paid for the medical expenses incurred by the
victim of the crime.519
Milligan v. Alaska
In Milligan v. Alaska,520 the court of appeals held that a witness’ alcohol-related memory
loss may be used to impeach evidence of her memory.521 The victim and a group of
friends were drinking at a bar when she invited them to drink at her house.522 They
returned to her apartment, where they continued drinking.523 The victim later woke up
and found Milligan on top of her.524 The lower court, in a jury trial, held that Milligan
was guilty of first and second degree sexual assault.525 Milligan attempted to introduce
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evidence that the victim experienced other alcohol-related memory losses near the time of
this incident, but the trial judge excluded this evidence, and Milligan appealed arguing
prejudicial error.526 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the court may permit
evidence of alcohol related memory loss because evidence of a witness’s mental state
may affect the witness’s ability to recall the events leading up to the incident, and
therefore may be admitted as evidence of a witness’s sensory capacity.527 Therefore,
reversing and remanding to the lower court, the court of appeals held that a witness’s
alcohol-related memory loss may be used to impeach evidence of her memory.528
N.G. v. Superior Court
In N.G. v. Superior Court,529 the court of appeals held that an order requiring production
of all medical records is improper where those records are protected by a
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the defendant has not shown an overriding interest
in disclosure or that the patient’s medical history is relevant to the case.530 Standifer was
charged with sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, and physical assault for an alleged
attack on N.G.531 Because the subsequent examination of N.G. made reference to
previous alcohol abuse and bipolar disorder, the superior court granted Standifer’s
request for the production of all of N.G.’s medical treatment records. 532 The superior
court reasoned that it could separate privileged and non-privileged information in those
records through in camera inspection.533 On appeal, N.G. argued that the superior court
should not have granted Standifer’s request.534 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning
that it was unlikely that there was any non-privileged information in those records
because the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to all confidential communications
made for diagnosis or treatment and to information generated during the psychotherapistpatient relationship.535 Moreover, the court reasoned that even if Alaska’s courts allowed
the psychotherapist-patient privilege to be overcome if the defendant shows a strong
interest in disclosure, the superior court did not make any such finding in this case.536
Lastly, the court found that Standifer did not offer any proof that N.G.’s medical history
would make it more likely that she could not reliably recall facts from the incident, and
therefore did not support the assertion that an in camera review of N.G.’s history would
be necessary.537 Reversing, the court of appeals held that an order requiring production of
all medical records is improper where those records are protected by a psychotherapistpatient privilege and the defendant has not shown an overriding interest in disclosure or
that the patient’s medical history is relevant to the case.538
526

Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1068–69.
528
Id. at 1067.
529
291 P.3d 328 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
530
Id. at 340.
531
Id. at 329.
532
Id. at 329–30.
533
Id. at 330.
534
Id.
535
Id. at 332.
536
Id. at 338.
537
Id. at 340.
538
Id.
527

37

Oskolkoff v. State
In Oskolkoff v. State,539 the court of appeals held that when a defendant is prosecuted for
either “repeat” or “habitual” minor consuming, the defendant’s predicate criminal history
is an element of the offense which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.540
A jury convicted Oskolkoff for “habitual minor consuming.”541 On appeal, Oskolkoff
argued that the lower court erred by determining that a defendant’s prior convictions
constituted a sentencing factor under AS 04.16.050, rather than an element of the
offense.542 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that under statutes which create
increased levels of offense for repeat offenders, each level is a separate offense and the
prior convictions are elements of that offense, unless the legislature clearly indicates
otherwise.543 Subsequently, upon analysis of the legislative history of AS 04.16.050, the
court found no indication to the contrary.544 Reversing the conviction and remanding for
new trial, the court of appeals held that when a defendant is prosecuted for either “repeat”
or “habitual” minor consuming, the defendant’s predicate criminal history is an element
of the offense which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.545
Pocock v. State
In Pocock v. State,546 the court of appeals held that the “small quantities” mitigator is
applicable to a drug offense when the quantity of drug sold is uncharacteristically small
in comparison to the broad middle ground of conduct prohibited by statute.547 Pocock
was convicted of three counts of second-degree controlled substance misconduct for three
sales of heroin, totaling 0.12 grams.548 Because he was a third felony offender, the
presumptive range for his sentence was 15 to 20 years.549 The superior court judge
rejected Pocock’s argument that the “small quantities” mitigator was applicable to his
sentence because he concluded that the amounts sold were not small in the context of the
use of heroin.550 On appeal, Pocock argued that the superior court erred by not applying
this mitigating factor.551 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that under Dollison v.
State,552 the question for determining whether the “small quantities” mitigator applies is
whether the sale falls within the broad middle ground of conduct prohibited by the
statute.553 Next, the court determined that the statute under which Pocock was convicted,
AS 11.71.020(a)(1), covers the entire spectrum of heroin sales, and that the amount at
issue in this case was within the least severe sentencing range for sales of heroin under
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federal law.554 Vacating and remanding for resentencing, the court of appeals held that
the “small quantities” mitigator is applicable to a drug offense when the quantity of drug
sold is uncharacteristically small in comparison to the broad middle ground of conduct
prohibited by the statute.555
Rogers v. State
In Rogers v. State,556 the court of appeals held that a continuance may be denied when the
requesting party repeatedly fails to demonstrate diligence in avoiding the continuance. 557
Rogers was granted several continuances for his sentencing hearing, the third of which
was granted so that he could obtain a psychiatric evaluation and diagnosis by a
psychiatrist licensed in California.558 A fourth continuance was later granted, at which
point Rogers’ attorney understood that Rogers may need to find a different psychiatrist
for licensing reasons.559 Instead, Rogers’ attorney filed a motion attacking the
constitutionality of the licensing statute.560 The superior court found the statute to be
constitutional and Rogers then asked for a fifth continuance to find another
psychiatrist.561 The superior court denied the motion, finding primarily that Rogers failed
to show diligence.562 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a lack of diligence may
result in a denial of a continuance.563 Given the number of continuances and Rogers’ lack
of efforts to obtain a temporary permit or a new psychiatrist, the court of appeals
agreed.564 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that a continuance may
be denied when the requesting party repeatedly fails to demonstrate diligence in avoiding
the continuance.565
Ruaro v. State of Alaska
In Ruaro v. State of Alaska,566 the court of appeals held that evidence provided at a search
warrant hearing, including potential past criminal activity, inconsistent statements about a
package’s contents, and emotional and angry actions by a suspect, was insufficient to
establish probable cause that the package contained cocaine.567 A supervisor at a shipping
facility notified the police that a suspicious package had arrived at the facility for
Ruaro.568 The supervisor reported that Ruaro had been angry at a delay in a previous
shipment, and that his pattern of receiving abnormally taped packages was unusual. 569
Ruaro refused to allow the police to search the box and also provided inconsistent
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information as to the shipper of the box and the box’s contents.570 Additionally, the
trooper testified that after they received phone calls regarding Ruaro’s alleged
involvement with drugs approximately two years prior, the police interviewed him and he
denied having any involvement in selling drugs.571 The magistrate found probable cause
to issue the warrant, and the trooper found one hundred grams of cocaine hidden inside of
the box.572 Ruaro moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the warrant was not
supported by probable cause.573 The superior court found that it was reasonable for the
magistrate to conclude that Ruaro’s behavior was suspicious; however, his suspicious
behavior coupled with the Crime Stoppers report did not establish probable cause that his
package contained cocaine.574 Reversing the superior court’s decision to deny the motion
to suppress evidence obtained from the warrant, the court of appeals held that evidence
provided at a search warrant hearing, including potential past criminal activity,
inconsistent statements about the package’s contents, and emotional and angry actions by
a suspect was insufficient to establish probable cause that the package contained
cocaine.575
Scholes v. State
In Scholes v. State,576 the court of appeals held that (1) intentional causation of extreme
pain during a sexual assault was sufficient to establish the aggravator deliberate
cruelty,577 and (2) the fact that conduct could have supported multiple convictions
establishes the aggravator that the conduct is among the most serious within the
definition offense.578 Scholes kidnapped a fifteen-year-old near a Juneau school, bound
her, and took her to his home.579 There, Scholes removed her clothes with scissors, and
raped the girl with both his penis and a wine shaped bottle.580 The trial court found two
aggravators: deliberate cruelty and conduct among the most serious within the definition
of the offense.581 Affirming, the court of appeals found that both aggravators were
established.582 Deliberate cruelty was established when, during the penetration of the girl
by the narrow end of the bottle, Scholes asked the girl if it hurt.583 When she replied yes,
he then inserted the wide end.584 As to the most serious conduct within the definition, the
court of appeals reasoned that a single charge which could encompass multiple charges,
like the various sexual penetrations in this case, generally permit the use of the
aggravator.585 The court of appeals also found no other reason in the briefs to deviate
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from that policy.586 Affirming, the court of appeals held that (1) intentional causation of
extreme pain during a sexual assault was sufficient to establish the aggravator deliberate
cruelty,587 and (2) the fact that conduct could have supported multiple convictions
establishes the aggravator that the conduct is among the most serious within the
definition offense.588
Sitigata v. State
In Sitigata v. State,589 the court of appeals held that, under the principle of joint
accountability, an award of restitution for injuries caused by a joint assault may properly
be imposed on a single defendant even when the charging document does not specify that
he is being held accountable as an accomplice.590 Sitigata and Fuavai jointly assaulted
Bays, breaking Bays’ teeth and jaw.591 Sitigata pleaded guilty to third-degree assault and,
as part of his sentencing, was subsequently ordered by the superior court to pay
restitution for the expenses attributable to the broken teeth and jaw.592 Sitigata argued on
appeal that Fuavai caused the broken teeth and jaw and that Sitigata should therefore not
be ordered to pay the entire restitution, especially because the charging document did not
specify that Sitigata was being charged as Fuavai’s accomplice. 593 The court of appeals
rejected this argument, holding that co-defendants are both liable for injuries caused
during their crime.594 The court stated that all participants are criminally accountable for
any resulting injury or death when two or more people jointly engage in an assault, and
further noted that it is irrelevant whether the charging document expressly charged one as
an accomplice.595 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that under the
principle of joint accountability, an award of restitution for injuries caused by a joint
assault may properly be imposed on a single defendant even when the charging document
does not specify that he is being held accountable as an accomplice.596
Starkey v. State
In Starkey v. State,597 the court of appeals held that the issuance of a search warrant mere
minutes after officers entered a home may absolve any error in the officers’ initial
entry.598 Officers arrived at Starkey’s house after receiving an anonymous tip about
marijuana he was growing.599 After knocking on the door with no response, they smelled
a strong marijuana plant odor and noticed unusual electrical activity indicative of a drug
grow, and subsequently sent another officer to obtain a search warrant. 600 When Starkey
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arrived home, the remaining officers entered his house and began searching it under the
reasonable belief that he had given them consent to do so.601 Approximately five minutes
later, the officer returned with a valid search warrant.602 At trial, Starkey filed a motion to
suppress the marijuana evidence gathered on grounds that he hadn’t actually given
unequivocal consent for the officers to enter his home.603 Finding that the independent
source doctrine applied, the court of appeals reasoned that the officer obtaining the
warrant had no knowledge that the other officers had entered the house and therefore that
fact did not influence the warrant application.604 Affirming the lower court, the court of
appeals held that the issuance of a search warrant mere minutes after officers entered a
home may absolve any error in the initial entry.605
Vent v. State
In Vent v. State,606 the court of appeals held that a trial judge fails to act impartially if he
conducts research of out-of-state records without prior notice to the parties and relies on
evidence outside of the record.607 A jury convicted Vent of second-degree murder and
several charges of assault and robbery.608 Vent brought a claim for post-conviction relief
for ineffective assistance of counsel.609 The trial court denied Vent’s motion for postconviction relief.610 On appeal, Vent argued that the judge failed to act impartially and
actively sought impeachment information in order to deny admitting evidence.611 The
court of appeals agreed, reasoning that a reasonable person would believe that the judge
was partial to the side of the State because the judge researched out-of-state records
without prior notice to the parties and relied on his findings from that research to impeach
evidentiary material Vent had offered at the post-conviction relief hearing.612 Reversing
the lower court, the court of appeals held that a trial judge fails to act impartially if he
conducts research of out-of-state records without prior notice to the parties and relies on
evidence outside of the record.613
Wing v. State
In Wing v. State,614 the court of appeals held that, by itself, an arrestee’s comment that her
cell phone is in her pocket does not constitute an affirmative request to contact her
attorney.615 After being arrested for DUI, Wing was taken to a police station.616 At the
station, Wing was shown a video that informed her that she could have, in addition to the
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breath test already taken, an independent chemical test conducted.617 Additionally, if she
did not understand this right, she could contact an attorney.618 After answering that she
wanted to call someone and mentioning that her cell phone was in her pocket, Wing used
the phone provided at the police station to call a co-worker.619 On appeal, Wing argued
that her right to contact an attorney was violated because she was denied access to her
attorney’s phone number, which was in her cell phone.620 The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Wing, after mentioning that she had her cell
phone in her pocket, failed to mention her cell phone again after being granted access to
the police station phone.621 The court further reasoned that Wing never informed the
arresting officer that her attorney’s number was in her cell phone or asked to make
another call.622 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that, by itself, an
arrestee’s comment that her cell phone is in her pocket does not constitute an affirmative
request to contact her attorney.623
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
U.S. v. Golden Valley Election Association
In U.S. v. Golden Valley Election Association, 624 the Ninth Circuit held that energy
records may be relevant to a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) investigation
and thus subject to subpoena.625 Golden Valley, a member-owned cooperative which
provides electricity, was subpoenaed by the DEA to provide records pertaining to three
customers.626 The DEA claimed the information was relevant to determine whether the
three residents were involved in the manufacture and distribution of controlled
substances.627 After Golden Valley did not comply, the government petitioned the district
court to enforce the subpoena, and the petition was granted.628 Affirming, the Ninth
Circuit held that the information subpoenaed need only be relevant to an agency
investigation, not the crime. The court noted that the information requested by the DEA
in this case satisfied relevancy requirements because the record could be used to compare
electricity usage in the vicinity.629 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that energy records
may be relevant to a DEA investigation and thus subject to subpoena.630
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Alaska Supreme Court
Davison v. State
In Davison v. State,631 the supreme court held that a sexual assault victim’s statements to
a doctor are not admissible under Alaska’s medical treatment exception to hearsay when
the statements are not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.632 R.D.
informed her mother that she was sexually assaulted by her father, Davison.633 R.D. was
brought to the hospital for an examination.634 In the course of the exam, the doctor
performed a physical evaluation of R.D. and collected a verbal account of what
occurred.635 Davison was later convicted of sexual assault.636 Davison appealed his
conviction, arguing in part that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay by admitting
statements made during the exam.637 The supreme court recognized that while hearsay is
generally not admissible, statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment may be admissible.638 The supreme court reasoned that the circumstances of the
case, including that a trooper arranged the interview and the doctor’s emphasis on the
forensic purpose of the exam, indicated that the exam’s goal was primarily forensic and
not medical.639 However, the court found the statements were harmless to the conviction.
Affirming the conviction, the supreme court held that a sexual assault victim’s statements
to a doctor are not admissible under Alaska’s medical treatment exception to hearsay
when the statements are not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.640
Phillips v. State
In Phillips v. State,641 the supreme court held that a judge may be removed from a case
based solely on the reasonable appearance of bias, and that de novo review is appropriate
for determining such appearance.642 Phillips was convicted of sexual assault, and
appealed on grounds that the trial judge should have recused himself when he realized he
knew the victim’s sister.643 The trial judge lived in the same neighborhood as the victim’s
sister, his wife was friends with her, and their kids played together.644 On appeal, the
supreme court held that, in general, a judge may be forcibly disqualified if the
circumstances are such that the judge would appear biased to a reasonable person.645
However, the court found that this situation did not create the appearance of bias.646
Affirming the lower court’s ruling, the supreme court held that a judge can be removed
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from a case based solely on the reasonable appearance of bias, and that de novo review is
appropriate for determining such appearance.647
Alaska Court of Appeals
Berezyuk v. State
In Berezyuk v. State,648 the court of appeals held that a claim is deemed waived on appeal
if the opening brief only mentions the claim without any argumentation or supporting
citation.649 Berezyuk was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to sell.650 On
appeal, he made several arguments concerning deficient Miranda warnings or,
alternatively, that his rights were violated through threats of deportation and increased
punishment if he did not cooperate. 651 In Berzyuk’s opening brief, twelve pages were
devoted to his Miranda rights claims, but he never asserted that he was improperly
coerced.652 The court of appeals rejected his Miranda claims and ruled that his claim of
involuntariness was forfeited.653 Berezyuk had the opportunity to further argue the
coercion claims already raised in the opening brief, but failed to do so.654 The court of
appeals held that a claim is waived on appeal if the opening brief only mentions the claim
without any argumentation or supporting citation.655
Diggs v. State
In Diggs v. State,656 the court of appeals held that a defendant is not required to take the
stand at a competency hearing because it is part of a criminal proceeding.657 Diggs, who
had a history of mental illness, was charged with two counts of assault.658 After reports
were submitted that Diggs was not competent to stand trial, the State requested a hearing
to contest the doctor’s opinion.659 The State declared its intention to call Diggs as a
witness.660 The superior court granted the motion, concluding that Diggs’ rights against
self-incrimination would not be violated so long as his statements were not admissible at
trial and were used solely for determining his competency. 661 On appeal, the court of
appeals held that, since legal proceedings had begun, a competency hearing was part of a
“criminal case” under the United States Constitution and part of a “criminal proceeding”
under the Alaska Constitution.662 Therefore, the court found that the right against selfincrimination applied to Diggs in this case and, as a defendant in a criminal proceeding,
647
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he could not be called against his will to take the stand.663 Reversing the superior court,
the court of appeals held that a defendant is not required to take the stand at a
competency hearing because it is part of a criminal proceeding.664
Jones v. State
In Jones v. State,665 the court of appeals held that if a defendant intends to testify at a
post-conviction evidentiary hearing and such hearing hinges on the defendant’s
credibility as a witness, then the defendant must be transported to the hearing.666 Jones
accepted a plea bargain for second-degree murder.667 Subsequently, Jones filed a petition
for post-conviction relief, challenging the representation his lawyer had previously
provided.668 To attend the hearing, Jones filed a motion asking to be transported to
Anchorage.669 The lower court denied the motion because the judge thought his
credibility as a witness could be fairly assessed whether the testimony was given in
person or over the phone; Jones later testified at the hearing by telephone. 670 On appeal,
Jones challenged the lower court’s decision to not allow him to provide testimony in
person.671 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals concluded that Jones
should have been allowed to attend this hearing.672 The court reasoned that, under Alaska
law, if a convicted defendant’s testimony will be “material” and based on facts within the
defendant’s personal knowledge, then the defendant’s presence at such hearings is
necessary.673 Vacating the lower court, the court of appeals held that if a defendant
intends to testify at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing and such hearing hinges on the
defendant’s credibility as a witness, then the defendant must be transported to the
hearing.674
Leopold v State
In Leopold v State,675 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s composite sentence of
109 years’ imprisonment is not inherently excessive.676 Leopold invited his sister to a
party at his house and raped her after she fell asleep.677 He was convicted of first-degree
sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, and incest.678 Based on the court’s finding
that Leopold was a worst offender, it sentenced him to a composite sentence of 109
years’ imprisonment.679 On appeal, Leopold challenged the court's finding that he was a
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worst offender and the length of his sentence.680 The court of appeals upheld the worst
offender finding due to Leopold’s multiple prior convictions, the unlikelihood of his
rehabilitation, and the extreme danger he posed to the public.681 The court of appeals also
upheld Leopold’s composite sentence because it was reasonable for the judge to find such
a sentence necessary to protect the public.682 Affirming the lower court, the court of
appeals held that a defendant’s composite sentence of 109 years’ imprisonment is not
inherently excessive.683
McKinley v. State
In McKinley v. State,684 the court of appeals declined to extend the scope of the statute
which gives defendants credit for time spent in custody to include credit for the entire
time spent in a residential treatment program.685 McKinley was charged with theft.686
While he was awaiting trial, he entered a residential treatment facility for five months.687
Later, he pled guilty and received a sentence of sixty months, but asked the superior court
to give him five months of credit for the time he spent in the residential treatment
program.688 The court gave him credit for only thirty days because only the first thirty
days of the program satisfied AS 12.55.027(c)(2)’s strict requirement that the conditions
must approximate those experienced by someone who is incarcerated.689 On appeal,
McKinley argued that the court should follow a more liberal standard for granting
credit.690 Affirming, the court of appeals held that the statute clearly only allows credit
for time spent in conditions similar to incarceration.691 The court of appeals reasoned that
the wording of the statute was clear, although possibly contradictory to the legislature’s
policy goals and the goals of the prison system.692 Affirming, the court of appeals
declined to extend the scope of the statute which gives defendants credit for time spent in
custody to include credit for the entire time spent in a residential treatment program.693
Selig v. State
In Selig v. State,694 the court of appeals held that the police are not required to record the
non-interrogative aspects of DUI processing.695 After causing a collision, Selig was
arrested for driving under the influence.696 A breath test and an independent blood test
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revealed a blood alcohol level more than double the legal limit in Alaska.697 Selig argued
in district court that the results of the tests should be suppressed because the officers did
not make an audio recording of the DUI processing.698 The district court denied the
motion, reasoning that the Stephan rule that requires an audio recording of every
custodial interrogation did not apply because the trooper did not interrogate Selig during
the DUI processing.699 On appeal, Selig renewed his argument that the evidence from his
DUI processing should be suppressed because the processing was not recorded. 700 The
court of appeals also disagreed, reasoning that the purpose of the Stephan rule was
narrowly tailored to assure that confessions were voluntarily made. 701 Further, the court
reasoned that police time logs could independently verify that the requirement for a
fifteen minute observation period before a breath test was followed.702 Affirming, the
court of appeals held that the police are not required to record the non-interrogative
aspects of DUI processing.703
Stansberry v. State
In Stansberry v. State,704 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s opportunity to
understand and regain the right to attend their proceedings can be satisfactorily explained
to them even if they are not physically present in the courtroom.705 The trial court judge
removed Stansberry from the courtroom after he failed to demonstrate his ability to
control himself within the courtroom.706 Stansberry was placed in a holding cell equipped
with audio and visual equipment that enabled him to watch his trial, and his attorney was
able to communicate with him at will.707 After being convicted, Stansberry argued that he
was not properly informed of his right to reenter the courtroom.708 Affirming Stansbery’s
conviction, the court of appeals held that even though Stansberry was not physically
present in the courtroom when the judge informed him he would be allowed to return if
he reformed his behavior, the audio and visual equipment was sufficient to ensure that
Stansberry was aware of his right to return.709 The court reasoned that the record clearly
showed Stansberry was able to hear the proceedings.710 Affirming, the court of appeals
held that a defendant’s opportunity to understand and regain the right to attend their
proceedings can be satisfactorily explained to them even if they are not physically present
in the courtroom.711
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Wilkerson v. State
In Wilkerson v. State,712 the court of appeals held that a witness' opinion concerning a
defendant's character is inadmissible when the witness lacks personal knowledge of the
defendant.713 The trial court found Wilkerson guilty of first-degree murder, evidence
tampering, and third-degree weapons misconduct in the death of his brother. 714 On
appeal, Wilkerson argued that it was improper to permit the State to present character
evidence consisting of the testimony of a police detective when that testimony was based
on hearsay.715 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that personal knowledge is
necessary when a witness provides character opinions.716 The police detective lacked this
personal knowledge since his opinion of Wilkerson was created by review of case files
and not personal acquaintance with Wilkerson.717 Accordingly, the trial court wrongfully
allowed the police detective to give his opinion of Wilkerson, but the court found the
error was harmless because eyewitness agreement rendered the opinion’s admission
moot.718 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a witness' opinion concerning a
defendant's character is inadmissible when the witness lacks personal knowledge of the
defendant.719
ELECTION LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
In re 2011 Redistricting Cases
In In re 2011 Redistricting Cases,720 the supreme court held that the Alaska Redistricting
Board (“Board”) must design a reapportionment plan based on the requirements of the
Alaska Constitution and then that plan must be tested against the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”).721 The superior court found that although the Board’s initial drawing of the
redistricting corresponded with the VRA, four districts did not comply with the Alaska
Constitution.722 The supreme court upheld the superior court’s ruling.723 Upon remand,
the Board made changes but only to the four districts.724 The superior court rejected the
amended plan.725 The supreme court upheld the superior court’s rejection of the Board’s
amended plan, reasoning that the Board created the twenty-two districts to comply with
the VRA as the first priority instead of first meeting the Alaska Constitution's
requirements of compactness, contiguity, and socio-economic integration as the primary
712
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consideration.726 The supreme court held that the Board must design a reapportionment
plan based on the requirements of the Alaska Constitution and then that plan must be
tested against the VRA.727
EMPLOYMENT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Boyko v. Anchorage School District
In Boyko v. Anchorage School District,728 the supreme court held that an employer’s
refusal to provide a recommendation for an employee does not violate a resignation
agreement in which the employer promised not to make negative statements about the
employee.729 Boyko resigned from her teaching position in lieu of termination after
violating an agreement which conditioned her continuing employment on several
provisions relating to alcoholism treatment.730 Boyko recorded a conversation with the
Anchorage School District’s human resources director in which the director stated that,
upon her resignation, no information would be released and no negative information
would be on her record.731 Following her resignation, the School District declined to
provide recommendations for her when contacted by Boyko’s prospective employers. 732
Boyko sued the School District for breach of the resignation agreement.733 The superior
court granted summary judgment for the School District and dismissed all of Boyko’s
claims.734 The supreme court remanded the issue of whether the resignation agreement
was a contract, but held that the School District’s refusal to provide a recommendation
for Boyko did not violate the resignation agreement.735 Affirming, the supreme court held
that an employer’s refusal to provide a recommendation for an employee does not violate
a resignation agreement in which the employer promised not to make negative statements
about the employee
Grundberg v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
In Grundberg v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights,736 the supreme court held
that the non-discriminatory reasons an employer provides for not promoting a person are
immaterial when evaluating whether that person provided substantial evidence that could
support an inference of discriminatory employer intent.737 Grundberg, a 58 year-old
Asian-American female, held an Engineer I position.738 While employed in this position,
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recruitment for an Engineer II position took place.739 After being denied the position for
facially legitimate reasons given by her interviewers, Grundberg filed a complaint. 740 The
commission charged with investigating the complaint ultimately concluded that the
complaint was not supported by substantial evidence despite a letter Grundberg filed
alleging multiple accounts of adverse employment actions she had been subjected to over
the course of her employment.741 The superior court affirmed this conclusion.742 On
appeal, Grundberg argued that she produced enough evidence to rebut her employer’s
facially legitimate reasons for hiring someone else for the Engineer II position.743 The
supreme court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.744 It reasoned that since
direct evidence is difficult to produce because it is often in the hands of the employer, the
evidence produced by Grundberg was substantial enough to support an inference of
discriminatory intent regardless of the reasons given by the employer.745 Reversing the
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the non-discriminatory reasons an
employer provides for not promoting a person are immaterial when evaluating whether
that person provided substantial evidence that could support an inference of
discriminatory employer intent.746
Lentine v. State
In Lentine v. State,747 the supreme court held that an employer may be found to breach an
implied covenant of good faith when terminating an employee by having a biased
supervisor involved in the decision only if the plaintiff proves that the biased supervisor
either (1) played a significant role in the decision, or (2) was motivated by bad faith.748
Lentine was terminated from her position with the State for falsifying information on a
timesheet.749 Subsequently, she filed a complaint against the State, alleging her
termination violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a
supervisor involved acted in bad faith during the termination.750 The superior court ruled
in favor of the State.751 On appeal, Lentine argued that the superior court erred because
her supervisor acted in bad faith during the termination process. 752 Affirming, the
supreme court found there was not a breach of the implied covenant because the
supervisor did not play an active role in the dismissal, and there was not adequate
evidence that the supervisor acted in bad faith.753 Affirming the superior court, the
supreme court held that an employer may be found to breach an implied covenant of
good faith when terminating an employee by having a biased supervisor involved in the
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decision only if the plaintiff proves that the biased supervisor either (1) played a
significant role in the decision, or (2) was motivated by bad faith.754
Oels v. Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n.
In Oels v. Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n.,755 the supreme court held
that Anchorage Municipal Code § 03.30.068(A)(4), which establishes a retire/rehire
program for city employees, requires that city employees be rehired into the same
position or into a position in the same or similar class.756 Oels was a sergeant in the
Alaska Police Department (“APD”) who sought to retire from his position and then be
rehired as a sergeant under a program established by § 03.30.068(A)(4).757 Section
03.30.068(A)(4) provides that an employee may retire and be rehired “at the entry level
salary, leave accrual, and seniority.”758 Oels was told that, if approved, he would be
rehired as a patrol officer, an entry level position below the rank of sergeant.759 The
superior court found the “entry level” language of § 03.30.068(A)(4) ambiguous and held
that it allowed the APD to rehire officers under the program at an entry level position.760
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s judgment, declaring that §
03.30.068(A)(4) unambiguously permitted the APD to rehire officers only at an entry
level “salary, leave accrual, and seniority,” but not at an entry level position.761 The
supreme court reasoned that the purpose of the retire/rehire program was to allow city
employees to retire and receive the benefits of their city retirement program, but still
return to work for the city under a new retirement program. 762 Reversing, the supreme
court held that § 03.30.068(A)(4) requires that city employees be rehired into the same
position or into a position in the same or similar class.763
Peterson v. State
In Peterson v. State,764 the supreme court held that based on Alaska’s Public Employment
Relations Act (“PERA”), a union-relations privilege is recognized for communications
(1) between an employee or employee’s attorney and union representatives, (2) made in
confidence, (3) in connection with representative services relevant to anticipated or
ongoing grievance or disciplinary proceedings, and (4) by representatives acting in
official representative capacity.765 Peterson was a member of Alaska State Employees
Association (“ASEA”) and requested time credit for a previous period of employment
with the State.766 During an investigation of his request, the State determined that
Peterson’s job application failed to disclose a prior felony and the State terminated his
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employment.767 Peterson first filed a grievance and after unsuccessfully resolving the
grievance, he filed suit in superior court for wrongful termination.768 The State
subpoenaed the ASEA representative who had handled Peterson’s grievance and the
superior court denied Peterson’s motion for a protective order preventing the ASEA
representative from testifying.769 Reversing, the supreme court reasoned that while the
attorney-client privilege did not extend to union representations, the court could
recognize a new privilege if it was found in state statutes, court rules, or the state or
federal constitutions.770 The supreme court found the privilege implied in Alaska’s
statutes, noting that the right granted by PERA for unions to operate free of harassment
and undue interference from the State includes the right to confidential communications
with union representatives.771 Reversing the superior court’s discovery ruling, the
supreme court held that a union-relations privilege is recognized for communications (1)
between an employee or employee’s attorney and union representative, (2) made in
confidence, (3) in connection with representative services relevant to anticipated or
ongoing grievance or disciplinary proceedings, and (4) by representatives acting in
official representative capacity.772
Trudell v. Hibbert
In Trudell v. Hibbert,773 the supreme court held that project owners who are potentially
liable for securing workmen’s compensation include business owners who hire
contractors to perform work that benefits their business.774 The Hibberts hired a
contractor to repair their residence, part of which functioned as the office for their cab
business.775 Trudell was the contractor’s employee and was seriously injured after falling
from a ladder while performing his work.776 The contractor did not have workers’
compensation insurance.777 Trudell sued his employer, who subsequently filed for
bankruptcy, as well as the Hibberts as project owners.778 After a bench trial, the superior
court found in favor of the Hibberts, declaring that project owners as defined by AS
23.30.045 are limited to business owners that contract out their usual work to others.779
On appeal, the supreme court held that the statutory definition of “project owner” does
not limit liability to instances when a business contracts out its usual work to others,
reasoning that the statutory text and the legislative history display the broad purpose of
ensuring workers compensation by requiring businesses to make sure their contractors
have insurance or to get it themselves.780 The proper test for determining project owner
liability is the extent to which the business benefitted from the work performed and the
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connection between the work and the business.781 Reversing the supreme court held that
project owners who are potentially liable for securing workmen’s compensation include
business owners who hire contractors to perform work that benefits their business.782
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
top
N/A
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
top
Alaska Supreme Court
L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson
In L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson,783 the supreme court held that the existence of an unsettled
area of law does not excuse an attorney from a duty of care. 784 Freeman was served
alcohol while visibly intoxicated by L.D.G., an authorized server of alcohol.785 Freeman
subsequently murdered a woman.786 In the following wrongful death action, Robinson,
L.D.G.’s attorney, did not assert a defense of third party liability, and the court found
against L.D.G. for a substantial sum.787 L.D.G. then sued Robinson for failing to assert a
defense of third party liability.788 The supreme court first examined the relied upon case
law and found that, despite Robinson’s argument to the contrary, the law was unsettled
regarding dram shop liability and liability of consuming patrons.789 The supreme court
then examined the duty of care of attorneys when the law is unsettled.790 It concluded that
the attorney must at least recognize the uncertainty and advise the client as to how to
proceed in light of the uncertainty.791 Therefore, Robinson had breached his duty of
care.792 Reversing and remanding, the supreme court held that the existence of an
unsettled area of law does not excuse an attorney from a duty of care.793
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FAMILY LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Adoption of Xavier K.
In Adoption of Xavier K.,794 the supreme court held that a biological parent who already
has a legal parent-child relationship with his or her own child is not qualified under
Alaska adoption statutes to adopt that child.795 Katz and Smith had a child, Xavier, but
never were married.796 Following a disagreement, Katz petitioned to adopt Xavier,
arguing that Smith’s consent was not needed since he had abandoned Xavier for at least
six months, had no meaningful communication with Xavier, and did not provide child
support payments.797 The superior court concluded that Smith did not need to consent to
the adoption, but decided that it was not in Xavier’s best interests to grant the adoption to
Katz and therefore denied the petition.798 On appeal, the supreme court found that
adoption would terminate a father’s parental rights without his consent and without a
legally obligated adult as a replacement, which contravened the purposes of adoption.799
Alaska’s adoption statutes allow for an individual to adopt another individual to create a
parent-child relationship.800 The court reasoned that since Katz already had a legal
parent-child relationship with her son, Katz could not use the adoption process to
terminate the parental rights of Smith.801 Affirming the decision of the superior court
denying Katz’s petition, the supreme court held that a biological parent who already has a
legal parent-child relationship with his or her own child is not qualified under the
adoption statutes to adopt the child.802
Berry v. Berry
In Berry v. Berry,803 the supreme court held that in order for attorney fees to be awarded
in a divorce proceeding where the economic status of both parties is essentially equal,
one party must act in bad faith.804 April Berry filed a complaint for divorce from her
husband, Michael Berry.805 April was represented by an attorney, and Michael
represented himself.806 At the end of trial, the superior court ordered Michael to pay April
for her part of her attorney's fees based on both parties' misconduct.807 Reversing in part,
the supreme court found that the superior court abused its discretion in awarding fees
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because the record did not show Michael acted in bad faith.808 The supreme court
reasoned that there is a two-step rule for awarding attorney fees in a divorce proceeding:
first, the court must determine how much of the fees each party would have had to bear in
order “to level the playing field;” second, the court may adjust the award to account for a
party’s bad faith or misconduct.809 Reversing in part, the supreme court held that in order
for attorney fees to be awarded in a divorce proceeding where the economic status of
both parties is essentially equal, one party must act in bad faith.810
Coleman v. McCullough
In Coleman v. McCullough,811 the supreme court held that a father is not entitled to a
child support deduction for obligations to his first child even if he had commenced a
relationship with the mother of his second child prior to the first child’s birth.812 Coleman
had two minor sons with two different mothers.813 Coleman had started a relationship
with the second mother prior to the birth of the first son. 814 When the first mother
petitioned for child support, Coleman argued that he should be allowed a deduction
because his relationship with the second mother began before his first son was born.815
The superior court ruled that Coleman was not entitled to a deduction.816 The supreme
court rejected Coleman’s contention that his income should be adjusted due to his current
support of and residency with the second son.817 The supreme court reasoned that a
parent’s duty of support begins the day of a child’s birth.818 Coleman therefore had a duty
of support to his first son on the day of his birth, and the fact that Coleman’s relationship
with the second mother began prior to the birth of his first son was immaterial to
determining support obligations.819 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held a
father is not entitled to a child support deduction for obligations to his first child even if
he had commenced a relationship with the mother of his second child prior to the first
child’s birth.820
Cox v. Floreske
In Cox v. Floreske,821 the supreme court held that awarding a lifetime right of first refusal
after marital property division is inequitable and an abuse of discretion.822 During the
marriage between Cox and Floreske, the couple accumulated a marital estate largely
consisting of three businesses and two subdivisions.823 According to their divorce
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proceedings, Floreske was awarded two of the businesses and a few real-estate
properties; Cox was awarded the other business and the majority of the properties in the
subdivisions.824 The court granted both parties a right of first refusal in the properties: if
one party tried to sell an awarded property, the other party had an opportunity to match
any offer tendered on the property.825 On appeal, Cox argued that this right of first refusal
should be vacated because of its indefiniteness.826 Agreeing with Cox, the supreme court
reversed the lower court’s decision to uphold the right of first refusal judgment. 827 The
supreme court reasoned that the lifetime right of first refusal was not equitable.828
Further, allowing Floreske to have this power over the property awarded to Cox could
create friction and was fundamentally against the goal of disentangling the parties.829
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that awarding a lifetime
right of first refusal after marital property division is inequitable and an abuse of
discretion.830
Day v. Williams
In Day v. Williams,831 the supreme court held that if there is no evidence that funds were
wasted between the date of separation and the trial, then valuing funds at the date of
separation to determine final property distribution upon divorce is improper.832 Day and
Williams separated in 2007.833 After their separation but before the trial to determine the
final property distribution, Day used $33,548 for her living expenses, which she
withdrew from a joint checking account.834 The superior court distributed this amount to
Day in its property distribution.835 On appeal, Day argued that this money should not
have been included in the final property division or alternatively that it should have been
valued closer to the time of trial.836 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held
that property value should be calculated near the trial date, not near the date of
separation.837 The court reasoned that, so long as funds are used for normal living
expenses, recapture of those funds cannot be justified.838 Reversing the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that if there is no evidence that funds were wasted
between the date of separation and the trial, then valuing funds at the date of separation to
determine final property distribution upon divorce is improper.839
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Gorton v. Mann
In Gorton v. Mann,840 the supreme court held that, for the purposes of calculating child
support payments, a parent is only permitted to deduct from his adjusted annual income
the amount of money actually paid for the support of children from a prior relationship.841
Gorton and Mann were the parents of a minor child.842 Gorton was also a parent of two
children from a prior marriage.843 After Gorton and Mann divorced, Gorton sought to
reduce the amount of child support he was required to provide Mann by deducting from
his adjusted annual income not only the amount he actually paid to his other ex-wife for
the support of their two children, but also an additional percentage for what he claimed to
pay in support of those children while they were living with him.844 The superior court
ruled against Gorton’s claim.845 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that, in shared
custody arrangements, additional deductions for the amount of money that a parent
spends on the children while they are in his custody are prohibited because this amount
has already been taken into account by the formula used for determining payments.846
Affirming, the supreme court held that, for the purposes of calculating child support
payments, a parent is only permitted to deduct from his adjusted annual income the
amount of money actually paid for the support of children from a prior relationship.847
Hannah B. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Hannah B. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,848 the supreme court
held that the superior court may consider a child in need of aid’s placement with a
relative as a factor weighing against the termination of parental rights in certain
circumstances, but such a consideration does not necessarily outweigh other factors like
permanency in determining the best interests of the child. 849 Hannah B., a mother with a
long and troubled history of drug abuse, sought to prevent termination of parental rights
to her son, Jacob.850 Jacob had been placed with his maternal grandmother beginning at
16 months of age and continuing, mostly without significant contact with his mother,
until he was three-and-a-half years old, when the Office of Children’s Services initiated
termination proceedings.851 The superior court granted termination, finding that Hannah
B. had failed to make timely and substantial progress in her treatment programs and that
Jacob required a permanent, stable arrangement immediately.852 On review, the supreme
court upheld the superior court’s ruling, reasoning that a child’s need for permanence and
stability may rightly govern the court’s best-interests analysis.853 The supreme court
rejected the claim that since a child would remain with a maternal grandparent whether or
840

281 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2012).
Id. at 81.
842
Id. at 82.
843
Id. at 81–82.
844
Id. at 83.
845
Id. at 82.
846
Id. at 83–84.
847
Id. at 81.
848
289 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2012).
849
Id. at 933–35.
850
Id. at 928.
851
Id.
852
Id. at 929.
853
Id. at 933–34.
841

58

not parental rights were terminated, it is clear error for the superior court to terminate
rights in this circumstance.854 The supreme court held that the superior court may
consider a child in need of aid’s placement with a relative as a factor weighing against the
termination of parental rights in certain circumstances, but such a consideration does not
necessarily outweigh other factors like permanency in determining the best interests of
the child.855
Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K.
In Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K,856 the supreme court held that a parent’s due process rights
are not violated by a court conducting in camera interviews with their three children
during custody proceedings, so long as the parties are provided summary transcripts.857
Helen S.K. and Samuel M.K. divorced, and subsequently went to a custody hearing for
their three children.858 At the conclusion of a hearing on interim custody, the superior
court agreed with Samuel’s request to interview the children despite Helen’s objection
that putting this responsibility on the children would be unhealthy and that they had
already been overly involved in the process.859 On appeal, Helen argued that the superior
court violated her right to due process by conducting in camera interviews with the
children because the transcripts of the interviews were not disclosed, and she did not
know the evidence that would be used against her at trial.860 Affirming, the supreme court
reasoned that while in camera interviews should be used only rarely because of the
possibility that they might constitute infringement of a parent’s due process rights,
sometimes in camera interviews may be in the best interests of the children.861 The court
then explained that as long as the parties are provided summaries of the interview
transcripts, the parents’ due process rights are not violated.862 Affirming, the supreme
court held that a parent’s due process rights are not violated by a court conducting in
camera interviews with their three children during custody proceedings, so long as the
parties are provided summary transcripts.863
Hunter v. Conwell
In Hunter v. Conwell,864 the supreme court held that repeated but inconsistent problems
with telephonic visitation by a non-custodial parent does not, by itself, constitute a
substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of parental rights.865
Conwell was awarded sole legal custody of the two sons he had with Hunter. 866 Two
years later, Hunter sought modification of the custody arrangement, alleging that a
substantial change in the children’s circumstances had occurred because, among other
854
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things, Conwell was interfering with court-ordered telephonic visitation.867 The superior
court found that Hunter had not demonstrated a substantial change in the circumstances
warranting modification of custody, but noted that the problems in telephonic visitation
would amount to a substantial change if not remedied.868 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s decision, and reiterated the admonition of the importance of
telephonic visitation when geographic separation makes frequent in-person parental
visitation impossible.869 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that repeated
but inconsistent problems with telephonic visitation by a non-custodial parent does not,
by itself, constitute a substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of
parental rights.870
In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of M.K
In In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of M.K,871 the supreme court held that
Alaska’s guardianship statutes do not require that a public guardian be appointed only
when no other qualified person is available.872 M.K., a thirty-four-year old woman,
suffered from many psychological disorders.873 The superior court held that M.K.
required a guardian because she was incapacitated as defined in Alaska’s guardianship
statutes and that the Office of Public Advocacy (“OPA”) should be appointed as guardian
in her best interests.874 M.K. appealed, arguing that her mother should have been
appointed as her guardian because the OPA should be appointed only if no other person
was willing and able to perform the functions of a guardian.875 The supreme court
reasoned that, while Alaska’s guardianship statutes set an order in which qualified
persons have priority for appointment as a guardian, the order may be altered if it is in the
best interests of the incapacitated person.876 The court explained that the Alaska’s
statutes’ plain meaning does not express that public guardians may be appointed only in
the case where there is no person willing and qualified to serve as a guardian. 877 The
supreme court further stated that the legislative history supported appointing a public
guardian if it was in the person’s best interests.878 Affirming the superior court, the
supreme court held that Alaska’s guardianship statutes do not require that a public
guardian be appointed only when no other qualified person is available.879
Josh L. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services delete?
In Josh L. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,880 the supreme court held
that the Office of Children’s Services’ (“OCS”) active-effort obligation under the Indian
867
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Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) to place a child in need of aid with a member of the same
family or tribe is determined on a case-by-case basis and is limited by the practical
circumstances of the case, including the parent’s inaction or incarceration and the
suitability of options within the family or tribe.881 Josh was indicted on charges of sexual
assault and agreed that his special-needs daughter Eva be temporarily placed in a
therapeutic foster home, deviating from the placement preference requirement of the
ICWA.882 After OCS failed to identify a family member or tribe suitable for Eva, Josh
appealed the superior court’s decision that OCS had fulfilled its active-effort obligation
by failing to seek placement with Josh’s extended family.883 Affirming the lower court,
the supreme court held that OCS’s efforts constituted active effort to prevent the break-up
of an Indian family, reasoning that each determination must be case-specific. The court
noted that OCS attempted to gain the consent of Josh’s mother to take Eva, determined
that several of his sisters had known sex offenders in their household, and attempted to
identify a Native village with the requisite resources to care for Eva. 884 Affirming, the
supreme court held that the OCS’s active-effort obligation under the ICWA to place a
child in need of aid with a member of the same family or tribe is determined on a caseby-case basis and is limited by the practical circumstances of the case, including the
parent’s inaction or incarceration and the suitability of options within the family or
tribe.885
Lewis v. Lewis
In Lewis v. Lewis,886 the supreme court held that a divorce settlement agreement which
splits assets in an amount exceeding 100% is not enforceable as there is no meeting of the
minds.887 Following Chad and Jessica Lewis’s divorce, they participated in a settlement
conference in superior court.888 Although the court initially recited a proposed settlement
that was agreed to by both parties, it subsequently accepted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law drafted by Jessica, which were materially different from the terms
initially cited.889 On appeal, Chad argued that the superior court’s findings of fact were
clearly erroneous and that the initial settlement should control.890 The supreme court
agreed in part with Chad’s argument.891 The court reasoned that the only evidence of the
parties’ intent was in the initially recited agreement, and there was no evidence for the
superior court to find that they had any different intent.892 However, the court reasoned
that the recited agreement could not control either because its terms created an impossible
outcome.893 Vacating and remanding, the supreme court held that a divorce settlement
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agreement which splits assets in an amount exceeding 100% is not enforceable as there is
no meeting of the minds.894
Mallory D v. Malcolm D
In Mallory D v. Malcolm D,895 the supreme court held that the presumption precluding a
parent with a history of domestic violence from obtaining legal or physical custody of the
children does not apply when both parties have committed acts of domestic violence
during the marriage.896 When Mallory and Malcolm filed for dissolution of their
marriage, the two agreed that, in addition to joint legal custody, they would share
physical custody of their three children.897 However, at a subsequent, Mallory moved to
change this custody agreement.898 During the proceedings, both Mallory and Malcolm
testified regarding domestic violence by the other on two separate occasions during the
marriage.899 As a result, the lower court denied Mallory’s motion to modify the custody
agreement.900 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that if the lower court found that
both parents had a history of domestic violence and neither was more likely to continue
this violence, the lower court had discretion to not apply the presumption to either
parent.901 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the
presumption that precludes a parent with a history of domestic violence from obtaining
legal or physical custody of the children does not apply when both parties had committed
acts of domestic violence during the marriage.902
Martha S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Martha S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,903 the supreme court held
that a therapist’s testimony regarding statements made during a therapy session may be
admissible under a medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.904 The Office of
Children’s Services took custody of Martha’s two youngest children.905 At a later
adjudication, the superior court found that the children were in need of aid and were to
remain outside the home for a period not to exceed 18 months.906 On appeal, Martha
challenged several of the superior court’s evidentiary rulings, including the use of a
therapist’s testimony.907 The supreme court found that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing into evidence the testimony of a therapist regarding statements one
of the children made to her during a therapy session.908 Because the purpose of the
therapy session was treatment and diagnosis, the court reasoned that the statements were
894
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admissible under a medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.909 Affirming the
lower court, the supreme court held that a therapist’s testimony regarding statements
made during a therapy session may be admissible under a medical treatment exception to
the hearsay rule.910
McLaren v. McLaren
In McLaren v. McLaren,911 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, property
acquired before marriage but during cohabitation may be included in the valuation of the
marital estate.912 Teresa and Darren McLaren first began living together in 1988, but they
did not become legally married until 1999.913 The superior court characterized the civil
service retirement benefits that Teresa accrued during the ten years she lived with Darren
before marriage as marital property.914 Teresa appealed, arguing that courts can only
divide property acquired during the actual marriage.915 Affirming the lower court, the
supreme court explained that as long as the parties ultimately do become married, courts
may consider the entirety of the parties’ relationships, including premarital cohabitation,
in the division of property.916 Reasoning that the couple acted as a single economic unit
while they lived together before marriage, the supreme court allowed the superior court
discretion in including premarital property in the marital estate.917 Affirming the lower
court, the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, property acquired before
marriage but during cohabitation may be included in the valuation of the marital estate.918
Patrawke v. Liebes
In Patrawke v. Liebes,919 the supreme court held that in the absence of a contrary reason,
a parent with joint custody can be ordered to legally consent to their child obtaining a
passport when the other parent presents compelling and timely arguments in favor of
obtaining one.920 Patrawke and Liebes were never married and never lived together, but
shared joint legal and equal physical custody of Kyndle.921 Patrawke sought consent from
Liebes to execute a passport on Kyndle’s behalf so Kyndle would be able to visit
relatives out of state and participate in her elementary school’s travel opportunities.922
Liebes did not consent and Patrawke sought a court order requiring Liebes to legally do
so.923 The superior court denied Patrawke’s motion, finding that the school’s travel
opportunities were too distant to necessitate a decision.924 On appeal, the supreme court
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reasoned that the courts were required to account for the child’s best interest in the
situation, and that Liebes failed to offer any reason why it would not be in Kyndle’s best
interest to obtain a passport.925 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that
in the absence of a contrary reason, a parent with joint custody can be ordered to legally
consent to their child obtaining a passport when the other parent presents compelling and
timely arguments in favor of obtaining one.926
Paula E. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Paula E. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,927 the supreme court held
that while the State should notify a grandmother of permanency and placement hearings
for her grandchildren, her due process rights are not violated by non-notification if she
has the opportunity to participate in subsequent hearings.928 Paula took care of her four
grandchildren for approximately a year until she left to take care of her ill mother.929
When Paula returned, the Office of Children’s Services informed her that because of
negative reports about her treatment of the children, they would be placed with another
family.930 Paula was not given notice of several hearings that took place regarding her
grandchildren’s status and placement.931 Paula asserted several claims of a violation of
her due process rights based on lack of notice, but the superior court disagreed.932
Affirming, the supreme court found that any prejudice from lack of notice was fixed by
her later opportunity to be heard and have her interests represented.933 The court weighed
three factors: (1) the private interest affected by official action, (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and (3) the
Government’s interest.934 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held
that while the State should notify a grandmother of permanency and placement hearings
for her grandchildren, her due process rights are not violated by non-notification if she
has the opportunity to participate in subsequent hearings.935
Stephanie F. v. George C.
In Stephanie F. v. George C.,936 the supreme court held that the statutory presumption
against awarding child custody to a parent responsible for acts of domestic violence may
be overcome by means other than the completion of the Batterers’ Intervention
Program.937 George and Stephanie sought physical and legal custody of their children
during divorce proceedings.938 The record showed that on two occasions George had
committed acts of domestic violence.939 George sought private counseling following the
incidents but did not complete the Batterer’s Intervention Program.940 The superior court
held that, due to AS 25.24.150(h), completion of the Batterers’ Intervention Program was
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the only way to overcome the statutory presumption.941 Nevertheless, the superior court
awarded George custody based on concern for the children’s wellbeing.942 The supreme
court held that completion of the Batterer’s Intervention program was not the only way to
overcome AS 25.24.150(g)’s presumption.943 The court reasoned that the plain meaning
and legislative history of the statutes supported the conclusion that the legislature used
the word “may” and included the phrase “where reasonably available” because it did not
intend that there should be only one way to overcome the statutory presumption.944
Remanding, the supreme court held that the statutory presumption against awarding child
custody to a parent responsible for acts of domestic violence may be overcome by means
other than the completion of the Batterers’ Intervention Program.945
Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V.
In Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V.,946 the supreme court held that in custody proceedings
where a mother brings allegations of sexual abuse against a father in good faith, the
mother should not be penalized for an unwillingness to foster a relationship between the
child and the father.947 Stephanie accused Maxwell, the father of her child, of sexually
abusing the child.948 Both parties sought legal and primary physical custody of the
child.949 The trial court found that Stephanie had not proven sexual abuse with
preponderance of evidence, and that she had shown an unwillingness to foster a
relationship between Maxwell and the child, which weighed against her receiving
custody.950 On appeal, the supreme court held that Stephanie had alleged sexual abuse in
good faith, and as such she should not be penalized for an unwillingness to foster a
relationship between father and child prior to the superior court’s ruling on whether abuse
occurred.951 Remanding in part, the supreme court held that in custody proceedings where
a mother brings allegations of sexual abuse against a father in good faith, the mother
should not be penalized for an unwillingness to foster a relationship between the child
and the father.952
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Tea ex rel. A.T.
In Tea ex rel. A.T.,953 the supreme court held that a child’s Permanent Fund Dividends
(“dividends”) may be claimed by redirecting a previously filed application even if the
claiming party did not have custody of the child on December 31.954 The Office of
Children’s Services (OCS) was granted custody of twins in early 2010.955 After OCS
notified the Department of Revenue of their custody, OCS was sent the children’s’
dividends.956 Nevertheless, the mother of the twins, who relinquished parental rights
voluntarily, filed suit claiming the dividends should be released to her because OCS did
not have custody of the children on December 31.957 On appeal, the twins’ guardian ad
litem argued that 15 AAC 23.223(i), the regulation at issue, provided two separate ways
to obtain the children’s dividends, including one that did not require custody on
December 31 before applying for the dividends.958 The supreme court agreed and
reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the first two sentences of the
regulation addressed different factual scenarios.959 The court further concluded that the
sentence addressing the redirection of existing applications could not have the same
December 31 requirement since it would make the second sentence wholly
superfluous.960 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a child’s
dividends may be claimed by redirecting a previously filed application even if the
claiming party did not have custody of the child on December 31.961
Tracy v. State, Department of Health and Human Services
In Tracy v. State, Department of Health and Human Services,962 the supreme court held
that a court should only award attorney’s fees against a non-prevailing pro se litigant in a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 case if it can determine that a reasonable layperson would have known
that his claims were without merit.963 Richard and Durena Tracy were the legal guardians
of their granddaughter, Annie.964 After Annie’s kindergarten teacher reported potential
sexual abuse against Annie by Richard, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) initiated
an investigation.965 The investigation of the Tracys was drawn-out and inconvenient, and
ultimately concluded that the charge against Richard was in error.966 Acting pro se, the
Tracys sued OCS in superior court for, among other things, a violation of their
constitutional rights under § 1983.967 The superior court granted summary judgment to
OCS and awarded a percentage of its attorney’s fees. 968 On appeal, the supreme court
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affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment but vacated its award of attorney’s
fees as an abuse of discretion.969 The court reasoned that courts are required to award
attorney’s fees against unsuccessful pro se litigants only if their claims were meritless
and asserted in bad faith.970 The supreme court held that a court should only award
attorney’s fees against a non-prevailing pro se litigant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case if it can
determine that a reasonable layperson would have known that his claims were without
merit.971
Villars v. Villars
In Villars v. Villars,972 the supreme court held that in the absence of contrary evidence,
under an agreement about the distribution of military benefits between two divorcing
spouses, distribution should begin from the moment of collection, not when the benefitreceiving spouse turns 60 years old.973 Richard and Kathleen Villars filed for dissolution
of marriage in superior court.974 During the dissolution proceeding, they agreed that
Richard’s military retirement benefits would be divided equally between them.975 When
Kathleen learned that Richard had retired early and begun receiving retirement benefits at
age 48, she sought and received an order from the superior court requiring half of
Richard’s military retirement benefits to be paid to her.976 On appeal, Richard argued that
the settlement agreement and the testimony in the superior court showed that both parties
intended for his retirement benefits to be his separate property until he reached the age of
60.977 The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the qualified domestic relations order
accepted by the court, which both parties signed, clearly demonstrated each party’s intent
to divide the benefits when Richard began receiving them, and that each party clearly
demonstrated their intent to do the same during the dissolution proceedings.978 Affirming,
the supreme court held that in the absence of contrary evidence, under an agreement
about the distribution of military benefits between two divorcing spouses, distribution
should begin from the moment of collection, not when the benefit-receiving spouse turns
60 years old.979
Weinberger v. Weinmeister
In Weinberger v. Weinmeister,980 the supreme court held that rebutting the presumption
against awarding custody of a child to a parent with a history of perpetuating domestic
violence, requires that parent to prove that each of the factors in AS § 25.24.150(h) have
been satisfied.981 Weinberger brought an action for child custody against Weinmeister in
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superior court after an instance of domestic violence led to the couple’s separation.982
Based on Weinberger’s testimony that Weinmeister had physically abused him on
multiple occasions, the superior court found that Weinmeister had a history of
perpetuating domestic violence.983 However, the court held that Weinmeister had rebutted
the presumption in Alaska Statute § 25.24.150(g) and awarded her custody.984 On appeal,
Weinberger argued that the court improperly applied Alaska Statute § 25.24.150(h) by
reading the statute to say “or” between each of the requisite factors rather than “and.”985
Reasoning that the legislature intended to require each of the factors to be satisfied before
overcoming the presumption against awarding custody, the supreme court agreed with
Weinmeister and reversed the superior court’s custody determination.986 The court note
Weinmeister had failed to make the requisite showing because she had not completed an
intervention program for batterers.987 Reversing, the supreme court held that rebutting the
presumption against awarding custody of a child to a parent with a history of perpetuating
domestic violence, requires that parent to prove that each of the factors in AS §
25.24.150(h) have been satisfied.988
Wilson v. Wilson
In Wilson v. Wilson,989 the supreme court held that the superior court has the authority to
dismiss or stay a divorce action if there is a reasonable and adequate alternative forum to
obtain a divorce decree, and issuing that decree may substantially impact property
division or child custody proceedings in an alternative forum.990 Irene Wilson left her
husband Dennis in Ohio, where they had resided, moved to Alaska with their son, and
filed for divorce.991 Dennis moved for dismissal, asserting the superior court lacked
jurisdiction.992 The superior court dismissed, finding that it lacked both personal
jurisdiction over Dennis and subject-matter jurisdiction over the child, and that Ohio
courts would be the proper forum.993 Affirming, the supreme court held that a party
seeking divorce in Alaska, with simultaneous proceedings in another jurisdiction, must
show good cause and lack of prejudice to obtain a divorce decree.994 While the court
reasoned that Alaska courts can have jurisdiction over divorce proceedings even when
lacking personal jurisdiction over one party, Alaska courts would not have jurisdiction
over other claims in this case, such as child custody and property division issues.995
Affirming the superior court’s decision, the court held that the superior court has the
authority to dismiss or stay a divorce action if there is a reasonable and adequate
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alternative forum to obtain a divorce decree, and issuing that decree may substantially
impact property division or child custody proceedings in an alternative forum. 996
INSURANCE LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp.
In Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp.,997 the supreme court held that an additional insured
under an automobile insurance policy may bring a cause of action for bad faith against
the insurer.998 Ennen was seriously injured while a passenger in a car accident when
Integon Indemnity Corp. (“Integon”) policyholder Shanigan drove off the highway.999
Integon paid Ennen under the bodily liability provision of the policy, but did not pay
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits to Ennen because of a provision limiting UIM.1000
Learning later that this provision was in violation of two Alaska statutes, Integon paid
Ennen UIM benefits plus prejudgment interest.1001 Ennen brought suit against Integon for
damages, alleging bad faith.1002 The superior court held that Ennen did not have a cause
of action for bad faith because he was an additional insured, as opposed to a “first-party
insured,” on Shanigan’s policy.1003 The supreme court, vacating the superior court’s
ruling, distinguished between intended third-party beneficiaries of a contract, who can
enforce rights in an insurance contract, and incidental beneficiaries, such as tort victims,
who cannot.1004 The court found that whether an insured is a policy-holder or an
additional insured is immaterial and that both are entitled to bring causes of action for
bad faith.1005 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed, holding that an additional insured
is entitled to bring a cause of action against the insurer for bad faith.1006
Grace v. Peterson
In Grace v. Peterson,1007 the supreme court held that, to the extent that parties do not
provide sufficient evidence to make a reasonable allocation of a lawsuit settlement
payment to a separate estate, the award should be classified as marital property. 1008 After
Grace suffered brain injuries in a motorcycle crash, he and his wife sued the helmet
retailer and manufacturer and brought a bad faith action against their insurance
company.1009 The couple separated after the accident, divorced for one month, but then
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remarried. 1010 An interpleader action was brought to the superior court to allocate the
recovery proceeds. 1011 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the superior court's equal
allocation of an insurance bad faith claim, holding that the classification of tort recoveries
for purposes of marital property division depends on the loss the recovery was intended
to replace, not the nature of the cause of action giving rise to recovery. 1012 The court
reasoned that proceeds of the settlement were subject to classification as marital and
separate property rather than divisible equally between husband and wife.1013 The
supreme court held that, to the extent that parties do not provide sufficient evidence to
make a reasonable allocation of a lawsuit settlement payment to a separate estate, the
award should be classified as marital property.1014
NATIVE LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Native Village of Eyak v. Blank
In Native Village of Eyak v. Blank,1015 the Ninth Circuit held that Alaskan Native villages
do not have exclusive use of claimed portions of outer continental shelf (“OCS”) of the
Gulf of Alaska where other tribes have fished and hunted on the periphery of the claimed
territory.1016 The Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations limiting access to
certain fisheries, and the several Alaskan Native villages (“Villages”) claimed the
regulations failed to account for their non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing
rights.1017 The lower court found the Villages did not have exclusive control, and the
Villages appealed.1018 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence that other groups
used land at periphery of OCS defeated the claim that the Villages exclusively used the
land.1019 The court further held that the OCS was such a vast area that the Villages’ low
population was incapable of controlling any part of the OCS.1020 Affirming, the Ninth
Circuit held that certain Villages do not have exclusive use of claimed portions of outer
continental shelf of the Gulf of Alaska where other tribes have fished and hunted on the
periphery of the claimed territory.1021
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PROPERTY LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
U.S. v. 300 Units of Rentable Housing
In U.S. v. 300 Units of Rentable Housing,1022 the Ninth Circuit held that a renewal notice
may be effective even when the amount of rent is undecided, so long as a method for
determining the rent is disclosed.1023 In a first-of-its-kind project, the United States Air
Force retained ownership of certain real property on which houses were built, but the
developer owned the houses and would lease them to the Air Force for a term of 20
years.1024 After the initial lease ran, the Government had the option to purchase the
houses, renew the lease, or have the houses removed.1025 The question before the court
was whether the amount of rent for a renewal term must be specified in the option to
renew a government lease to make that renewal valid.1026 The Ninth Circuit held that,
because the lease included a method the court could apply to determine the rent, the
option was enforceable.1027 The court noted that the fact that the parties did not come to
an agreement on rent prior to the renewal date did not render the option invalid since the
option clause did not expressly require such agreement prior to renewal.1028 The Ninth
Circuit held that a renewal notice may be effective even when the amount of rent is
undecided, so long as a method for determining the rent is disclosed.1029
Alaska Supreme Court
Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC
In Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,1030 the supreme court held that including foreclosure
costs in homeowner reinstatement quotes does not violate Alaska’s non-judicial
foreclosure statute.1031 Albrecht faced foreclosure on her home after defaulting on her
promissory note, and requested a reinstatement quote. 1032 Alaska Trustee provided the
reinstatement quote and included in it various foreclosure costs including late charges,
inspection charges, and other fees and costs.1033 Albrecht brought a class action lawsuit
on behalf of similarly-situated homeowners, alleging that the inclusion of such fees
violated their right to cure under Alaska’s non-judicial foreclosure statute.1034 The
superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and that the inclusion of
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such costs in the reinstatement quote was permitted under the statute.1035 The supreme
court affirmed the superior court, holding that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in
homeowner reinstatement quotes does not violate Alaska’s non-judicial foreclosure
statute.1036
Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
In Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough,1037
the supreme court held that a site visit is a meeting for the purposes of the Open Meeting
Act when (1) information-gathering and discussion during the visit constitutes
consideration of a matter on which a governmental body is empowered to act, and (2) the
visit is a key step in the body’s decision-making process.1038 Gold Country Estates
Preservation Group (“GCE”) brought an action against Fairbanks North Star Borough
(“Borough”) after the Borough’s platting board decided to allow a lot owner to build a
road through GCE’s subdivision.1039 The superior court found that GCE’s covenants
prohibited the road, but that the Borough had not violated the Open Meeting Act during
its decision-making process.1040 On appeal, GCE argued that the site visit relied upon by
the Borough’s platting board was a meeting under the Act and that adequate notice of the
visit had not been given because individual “Dear Property Owner” letters had not been
sent to homeowners in the subdivision.1041 The supreme court agreed with GCE that the
site visit constituted a meeting under the Act, reasoning that the platting board members
received evidence at the visit which would help in the decision-making process.1042
However, the supreme court disagreed that “Dear Property Owner” letters were required
because the site visit was not a meeting in which final resolution of the replatting issue
would be made.1043 The Borough was only required to provide reasonable public notice,
which was accomplished through newspaper and online announcements.1044 Affirming,
the supreme court held that a site visit is a meeting for the purposes of the Open Meeting
Act when (1) information-gathering and discussion during the visit constitutes
consideration of a matter on which a governmental body is empowered to act, and (2) the
visit is a key step in the body’s decision-making process.1045
Gottstein v. Kraft
In Gottstein v. Kraft,1046 the supreme court held that a home used during marriage but no
longer occupied is not considered a “family home or homestead,” thus both spouses do
not need to sign off on its transfer.1047 Jim and Terrie Gottstein lived in a home purchased
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by Jim and deeded to Terrie during their marriage.1048 After they moved out and later
separated, Terrie sold the property for under its appraised value.1049 Jim sought to assert
an interest in the property, citing AS 34.15.010, which requires husband and wife join the
deed together when conveying a family home.1050 The lower court granted summary
judgment against Jim.1051 On appeal, the supreme court held that AS 34.15.010 does not
apply to a vacant former marital home.1052 The supreme court reasoned that since the
home was not the family’s residence when it was sold, the statute did not require Terrie
to include Jim in the conveyance.1053 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme
court held that a home used during marriage but no longer occupied is not considered a
“family home or homestead,” thus both spouses do not need to sign off on its transfer.1054
HP Ltd. Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark
In HP Ltd. Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark,1055 the supreme court held that a covenant
that only permits single-family dwellings or recreational use of land does not regulate
ownership of the property.1056 After a homeowners association for a multi-family
subdivision (“Airpark”) assumed possession of a lot to be used for recreational purposes
in a neighboring single-family subdivision, a developer for the property sued to prevent
Airpark from using it, claiming Airpark’s ownership violated covenants attached to the
lot including a single-family restriction.1057 On appeal, the supreme court held that while
the single-family restriction was ambiguous in that it could either be a land use or a
building use restriction, it placed no limitation on ownership of the lot.1058 The supreme
court reasoned that Airpark was permitted to own the land, so long as it did not violate
other features of the covenant.1059 Affirming the superior court’s ruling on this particular
issue, the supreme court held that a covenant that only permits single-family dwellings or
recreational use of land does not regulate ownership of the property.1060
Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC
In Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,1061 the supreme court held that foreclosure fees may
be included in a sum in default, and therefore a lender could add foreclosure fees to a
reinstatement amount.1062 Kuretich purchased a home in 2001, and when he fell behind
on his mortgage payments in 2008, his mortgage company authorized Alaska Trustee,
LLC to begin foreclosure proceedings.1063 Kuretich paid a reinstatement fee that included
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foreclosure costs, but again fell behind on payments in 2009.1064 This time, he refused to
pay the foreclosure costs included in the reinstatement fee, arguing that they did not
consist of “sums in default” under the Alaska statute detailing foreclosure
proceedings.1065 The court reasoned that including foreclosure fees and costs in a
reinstatement fee was consistent with the statute, especially when the homeowner’s deed
of trust with the mortgage company specifically indicates that reinstatement fees include
the costs incident to foreclosure.1066 Affirming the superior court and adopting its
decision, the supreme court held that foreclosure fees may be included in a sum in
default, and therefore a lender could add foreclosure fees to a reinstatement amount.1067
Oakes v. Holly
In Oakes v. Holly,1068 the supreme court held that the doctrine of mutual mistake does not
apply to drafting errors in proposals for judicial partition of property.1069 Oakes and
Holly both owned interest in a twenty-acre parcel of land.1070 Oakes filed a complaint for
judicial partition and both parties agreed to partition the property with both parties
submitting three proposals.1071 The superior court selected one of Oakes’ partition
proposals; however upon completion of a survey, an error in the map proposed to the
superior court was discovered, with more valuable albeit less land going to Holly.1072 The
superior court determined that since the proposal was not an accurate portrayal of the
property, there was a material mutual mistake of fact related to a basic assumption of the
contract.1073 Oakes, the party requesting a revised partition, bore the risk of mistake and
the superior court enforced Oakes’ proposal as surveyed despite the error. 1074 The
supreme court reasoned that the parties’ agreement to submit three proposals to the court
was analogous to a partial settlement contract; however, the drafting error in the
proposals was not a mistake related to contract formation.1075 The court stated that the
parties agreed to a judicial partition, whereby the parties agreed to adopt procedures to
resolve the litigation1076 and the mistake in the proposals occurred three months after this
agreement.1077 Remanding on other grounds, the court held that the doctrine of mutual
mistake does not apply to drafting errors in proposals for judicial partition of property.1078
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Reed v. Parrish
In Reed v. Parrish,1079 the supreme court held that mortgage payments made pursuant to a
domestic violence protection order are not credited to the paying party during property
division post-separation of a domestic partnership.1080 From 1998 to 2009, Reed and
Parrish were in a romantic relationship.1081 The couple had two children together but
never married.1082 In 2009, Parrish obtained a domestic violence protection order against
Reed and was awarded possession of the house the two purchased together, while Reed
was ordered to continue to make mortgage payments.1083 On appeal, Reed argued that the
lower court erred in not crediting him for the mortgage payments he made.1084 The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision to not credit Reed for the mortgage
payments made pursuant to the domestic violence protection order.1085 Since the domestic
violence protection order awarded Parrish the house and ordered Reed to continue to
make mortgage payments, the court reasoned that to credit the mortgage payments would
disrupt the relief granted to Parrish in the order.1086 Furthermore, the court found that the
mortgage payments provided stability for the couple’s children during the litigation
because Parrish had always stayed home to care for them.1087 Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the supreme court held that mortgage payments made pursuant to a domestic
violence protection order are not credited to the paying party during property division
post-separation of a domestic partnership.1088
Roberson v. Manning
In Roberson v. Manning,1089 the supreme court held that, by itself, failure to transfer title
does not necessarily mean a person’s ownership in a vehicle has not been transferred to
another person.1090 Roberson and Manning purchased a motor home together.1091 Later, at
a hearing for protective order against Roberson, Manning promised that he was going to
pay off what he owed and that Roberson could have his ownership share.1092 However,
Manning later titled the mobile home in only his name and sold it.1093 Roberson sued for
declatory and injunctive relief, but the superior court concluded that Manning did not
give his share of the mobile home to Roberson since there was no title transferred to
her.1094 On appeal, Roberson argued that she owned the mobile home in its entirety
because Manning gave her his share.1095 The supreme court vacated and remanded the
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lower court’s conclusion that a lack of title transfer was dispositive in proving Manning
never gave his ownership in the mobile home to Roberson.1096 The court reasoned that
failure to transfer title creates a presumption that ownership had not been delivered, but
other evidence, such as oral testimony, could outweigh the presumption.1097 Vacating and
remanding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that failure to transfer title
does not necessarily mean a person’s ownership in a vehicle has not been transferred to
another person.1098
Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc.
In Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc.,1099 the supreme court held
that the mootness exception for attorney’s fees allows a plaintiff without ongoing
standing to pursue an appeal if review of the main issue in the case could potentially
relieve him of liability for attorney’s fees.1100 Conflict developed between Schweitzer and
members of the Subdivision Association over a property easement.1101 Each party filed
suit, attempting to quiet title on certain lots and determine the reach of the easement.1102
The superior court ruled against Schweitzer and assessed attorney’s fees against him.1103
Schweitzer subsequently lost title to his property through foreclosure, thus depriving him
of standing upon appeal and rendering his appeal of the superior court’s decision
moot.1104 Overruling objections by the Subdivision Association, the supreme court agreed
to hear Schweitzer’s appeal on the main issue in the case despite its mootness because
such a review provides the only recourse for plaintiffs with extensive liability for
attorney’s fees.1105 The supreme court reasoned that the mootness exception for
attorney’s fees seeks to recognize a party’s continued interest in a claim based on liability
for attorney’s fees even when he otherwise lacks standing to pursue an appeal.1106
Affirming, the supreme court held that the mootness exception for attorney’s fees allows
a plaintiff without ongoing standing to pursue an appeal if review of the main issue in the
case could potentially relieve him of liability for attorney’s fees.1107

1096

Id. at 1093.
Id.
1098
Id.
1099
278 P.3d 1267 (Alaska 2012).
1100
Id. at 1272–73.
1101
Id. at 1269.
1102
Id. at 1270.
1103
Id. at 1271.
1104
Id. at 1272.
1105
Id.
1106
Id. at 1273.
1107
Id. at 1272–73.
1097

76

TORT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc.
In Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc.,1108 the supreme court held that manufacturers have a
post-sale duty to inform consumers of potentially life-threatening dangers in their
products that become apparent after the sale.1109 Jones accidentally amputated his leg
while working on a hydromulcher manufactured by Bowie Industries (“Bowie”).1110 He
filed various tort claims against Bowie, and at trial the court instructed the jury that
Bowie had a duty to warn Jones of life-threatening dangers associated with the
hydromulcher.1111 On appeal, Bowie argued there was no post-sale duty to warn.1112
Affirming, the supreme court held that manufacturers have a post-sale duty to inform
consumers of potentially life-threatening dangers in their products, even if these dangers
do not become apparent until after the purchase.1113 The court reasoned that where a
manufacturer has reason to know of a potentially life-threatening risk, and can identify
recipients of the sale, then the manufacturer should give notice to those consumers.1114
Affirming, the supreme court held that manufacturers have a post-sale duty to inform
consumers of potentially life-threatening dangers in their products that become apparent
after the sale.1115
TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Dan v. Dan
In Dan v. Dan,1116 the supreme court held that (1) the contents and execution of a will
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence,1117 and (2) the presumption that a lost
will was destroyed for the purposes of revocation is a rebuttable presumption.1118 Rose
executed a will in 1987.1119 Later, she executed a second will that revoked the first;
however this revised will was lost before probate.1120 During probate, one of Rose’s three
daughters produced an accurate copy of the second will but because the will was not
signed, the court concluded that it must find that Rose destroyed the original will to
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revoke it.1121 The court then divided the estate according to intestate succession.1122 The
supreme court, relying on other jurisdictions and concerned that a low standard could
lead to cases of fraud, held that the contents of a lost will must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.1123 The supreme court also held that the presumption of revocation
based upon destruction is rebuttable.1124 Since the superior court did not announce
whether Rose’s proper execution of a second will met the clear and convincing standard
and did not find whether the evidence presented at trial overcame the presumption that
Rose revoked the will, the supreme court remanded to the superior court.1125 Remanding
for further inquiry, the supreme court held that (1) the contents and execution of a will
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence,1126 and (2) the presumption that a lost
will was destroyed for the purposes of revocation is a rebuttable presumption.1127
Pestrikoff v. Hoff
In Pestrikoff v. Hoff,1128 the supreme court held that the concept of equitable distribution
used in divorce proceedings does not apply in probate proceedings.1129 After Dorothy
Morrison died intestate, her children from a previous marriage claimed that her property
with her husband at death should be evaluated according to the principle of equitable
distribution of marital property.1130 Thus, a boat to which Morrison’s husband had sole
title, but which was purchased during their marriage, would become an undivided interest
of the estate and ultimately passed to the children.1131 However, there was strong
evidence that the pair had intended for Hoff to individually preserve title to the boat.1132
Affirming the lower court ruling that title to the boat be preserved, the supreme court held
that equitable distribution as used in divorce proceedings should not be used in probate
proceedings.1133 The court reasoned that unlike in divorce proceedings, it was clear from
legislative history and prior case law that Alaska’s probate statute determined ownership
based on title, and that the legislature did not intend for property to be retitled upon
spousal death.1134 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the concept of
equitable distribution used in divorce proceedings does not apply in probate
proceedings.1135
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